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INTRODUCTION
On November 8, 2016, after a long and particularly contentious presidential
general election, Donald J. Trump claimed victory over his opponent Hillary Rodham
Clinton. Although Clinton took the popular vote by over 3 million votes, Trump claimed
the electoral vote by unexpected gains made primarily in the Rust Belt of America. The
surprise of Trump’s win sent shock waves out from Washington D.C. as it challenged
much of what we thought we knew about political campaigning, the presidency, and
rhetoric. Throughout the campaign a vast majority of political polls predicted an almost
certain victory for Clinton. Patrick Murray, Director of the Monmouth University Polling
Institute lamented, “The polls were largely bad, including mine. But if anyone thinks they
have the answer right now, they are just guessing,” (Bialik & Enton, 2016). Political
analysts and media commentators found themselves trying to explain on live television
how a man that had engaged in often divisive and problematic rhetoric was just elected
the President of the United States. CNN analyst Van Jones offered a particularly emotion
filled election analysis:
You tell your kids don’t be a bully, you tell your kids don’t be a bigot…and then
you have this outcome. You have people putting children to bed tonight and they
are afraid of breakfast. They’re afraid of ‘How do I explain this to my children?’”
(Ryan, 2016)
Across the nation many were asking the same question, what did we get wrong?
What are we missing in this election? All signs seem to point to a phenomenon which
data has a notoriously difficult time representing, emotion. “Supporters and opponents
became the media themselves, spreading and amplifying subjective and emotional
affective news-news designed to provoke passion, not inform,” (Hermida, 2016).
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Hermida further opined that changes in the nature and role of media produced a “circular
environment where emotion often overrides evidence, fueling the rise of polarized,
passionate, and personalized streams of information,” (2016). Unfortunately for Clinton,
this acceleration of emotion served to motivate Trump’s voter base with a ferocity that
was not mirrored in her own voter turnout efforts:
While polling data correctly predicted the popular vote win for Clinton, it failed to
make the more nuanced call that anger among working class white voters ran
deep, and would drive them to the polls in larger numbers than the lukewarm
Clinton supporters in the Democratic base. (Carpenter, 2016)
This sentiment was not without precedent before the election. Some argued that the
political landscape in America is similar to the one in the United Kingdom that recently
prompted people to vote to exit the European Union:
The 2016 presidential election is more like the Brexit vote in many ways than it is
like prior presidential elections. Both Brexit and this presidential election
involved raw emotion, populism, anger, nationalism, class division, and other
factors that distort accuracy in polling. (Dershowitz, 2016)
Although Trump’s election may have been born of populist anger, his accession to the
presidency did not serve to vanquish that emotion from the American electorate. Instead,
it mobilized dissent over the outcome of the election.
Donald J Trump became 45th President of the United States when he was sworn
into office on January 20, 2017. The day after, on January 21, 2017, opponents of
Trump’s victory revealed their own emotions as millions of protesters marched across the
world in a coordinated effort called the Women’s March on Washington. The protesters
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were reportedly were acting out of “outrage and despair” at the results of the election of a
man many believe to be a misogynist:
In Manhattan, Fifth Avenue became a tide of signs and symbolic pink hats, while
in downtown Los Angeles, shouts of ‘love trumps hate’ echoed along a one-mile
route leading to City Hall, with many demonstrators spilling over into adjacent
streets in a huge, festival-like atmosphere. (Chira & Alcindor, 2017)
Since that day of protest, emotions have not subsided for Trump supporters or detractors.
In the aftermath of the Women’s March, Trump supporters have managed to mobilize
scattered rallies of support for the President’s initiatives. Organizers for the Women’s
March have waged numerous attempts to translate the march’s mobilization into a
national women’s strike as well as numerous campaigns to contact elected representatives
in opposition to Trump.
These are indeed emotional times, but that in and of itself is not the problem.
Instead, the problem lies in the logos-centric fear invoked by labeling a period emotional.
It triggers alarmist fears that pathos has staged a coup, rationality has left the country, and
the demolishment of democracy is nigh. Fear of an emotional electorate is not limited to
the media and political analysts; instead its history is seeped in the very structure of our
society. This work argues that this phobia puts rhetorical theorists at a disadvantage
because it led to the underdevelopment of pathetic theory. Subsequently, in the aftermath
of elections like the one in 2016 that left the electorate in a highly emotional state,
analysts are at a loss to understand what happened and what could happen next.
There are currently grounds to claim that a lot of people don’t really care about
rational, logical arguments in our political sphere. In a country where our democratic
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system of government is based on the premise that the most logical argument will
eventually win out, this poses a significant problem. What is needed now is productive
reflection and this work suggests we begin with a basic tenet of rhetorical theory, pathos.
Rhetoric and Presidential Studies
In 2010 Mary Stuckey argued:
I want to suggest that those of us who work in the areas of presidential rhetoric
and the rhetorical presidency are fast approaching the point where we need less
codification and more new thinking; we need fewer case studies that illustrate
principles we already acknowledge and more work that challenges our
understanding. (p. 39)
In an attempt to answer this call, I look to the Office of the First Lady (OFL) to
identify the way in which the rhetorical presidency should be expanded to include
additional actors that can help satiate the populace’s craving for emotion. I aim to reveal
that much of the potential to access the political capital and influence of the first lady is
rooted in pathetic dimensions derived primarily from the imagery that surrounds the
tension between her private and political roles in the public sphere. But when pathos is
considered to play a greater role in the public, the powers of the president and the first
lady appear more intertwined. I argue that the president has the power to speak about
American life in front of the public, but the first lady is uniquely positioned to embody
the power to live the American life in front of the public.
Therefore the central question is not whether the OFL has power, but through
what rhetorical means can the OFL utilize it, regardless of the patriarchal insecurities that
have traditionally been suspicious of this possibility. More specifically, these criticisms
illustrate the pervasive fear that the rationalized, masculine, logos-centered Office of the
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President may be defiled or contaminated by the emotional, pathetic nature of the Office
of the First Lady. Setting these concerns aside raises the question, “What are we missing
when we evaluate the Office of the First Lady through only her logo-centric connection
to power and influence and marginalize the pathetic appeal of her political discourse?”
To engage this question, I propose to examine the rhetorical role that Michelle Obama
has enacted during the Obama Administration.
Chapter Discussion
In the first chapter I chart the evolution of logos and the parallel devolution of
pathos stemming from pre-Aristotelian times. In addition, I explore the cultural and
technological changes that have brought visuality and the body to the forefront of our
political understandings. In the second chapter I establish the foundation for my
comparison of the primarily verbal, logos-centric political argumentation, and the
primarily visual, pathetic political argumentation. In this effort, I look to Aristotle’s
original conception of rhetorical proofs ethos, logos, and pathos to suggest an alternative
interpretation for the role of pathos in rhetoric.
In the third chapter I seek the source of pathetic power by bringing Hariman’s
theories of political style into conversation with Foucault’s concept of bio-power. This
comparison is then used to examine the way in which First Lady Michelle Obama utilizes
her proximity to the president as a form of power invested in her own body.
In the fourth chapter I will seek to understand the way in which the physical body
of the First Lady Michelle Obama has operated as a site for contestation of political
argument. In order to explore this perspective I will employ a visual analysis to “read”

	
  

6

Michelle Obama’s body for what it reveals and what it hides from our public
understanding of the requirements of modern citizenship. In this analysis I will turn to
images of the first lady as disseminated by the White House, the Associated Press, and
Reuters. Focusing on the first lady and the way in which her body has been inspected and
dissected by the media offers a comparison to the President in that these types of
representation were not prevalent in his campaign for the nation’s health.
In Chapter Five, I aim to show what we are missing without a concept of pathetic
politics in our rhetorical toolkit. Embodiment and episteme are explored as tools of
citizenship and democracy as displayed through the rhetoric of Michelle Obama acting as
a political surrogate for presidential candidate Hillary Clinton. I conclude with
commentary on implications for rhetorical studies as well as notes for future research.
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CHAPTER 1 THE RHETORICITY OF RHETORICAL PROOFS
In their study of the utilization of political imagery on television, Grabe and Bucy
(2009) argued, “granting visuals their deserved status as reliable forms of political
information requires somewhat of a paradigm shift in thinking about television news and
democracy (p. vii).” Essentially, they explained, this paradigm shift requires a
reconsideration of theoretical stances that define the rational purely in terms of logos and
so preclude an understanding of emotional response in political decision-making.
Investigations of the power of these pathetic appeals are relatively new phenomena that
have recently been recognized in professional avenues like advertising. For example, in
2014 Rossolatos explained, “One of the key reasons that have been put forward for
justifying the superior argumentative force of visuals over verbal arguments in
advertising discourse is their immediacy,” (p. 1). While Rossolatos engages in an
unnecessary hierarchical argument between the verbal and the visual, his primary point
represents well the growing appreciation for pathos and the visual in the fields connected
to rhetoric. Studies like this one have the effect of changing the context in which pathetic
appeals operate. Traditional means of argumentation have been stymied by theoretical
paradigms based on the enlightenment’s dream of a purely “rational man,” despite recent
rhetorical scholarship that reveals this ‘dream’ is limiting in both theory and practice.
Conventionally, logos is prized in western societies because of its presumed
relevance for aiding democratic decision-making. The idea that emotional decisionmaking can be helpful to a democratic society, because it has the potential to promote
engagement and interaction among the citizenry, defies the logos-centered conception of
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public discourse. This reversal requires a dismissal of the idea that rationality in public
discourse exists solely through the use of logos.
This paradigm shift allows for exploration of this process through analysis of
image systems. Examination of the theoretical, practical, and legal conceptions of
citizenship in the United States reveals the way in which aesthetics serve to activate
modes of citizenship among the populace. Asen (2004) follows Dewey in his discourse
theory of citizenship by arguing, “Creative, aesthetic uses of communication promise to
reconnect people to public affairs and to each other” (p. 197). Further, scholars like Allen
(2004) insist that the very creation of “the people” is a process of imagination and
imagery, “‘The people’ exists only in the imaginations of democratic citizens who must
think themselves into this body in order to believe that they act through it. Democratic
politics cannot take shape until ‘the people’ is imaginable” (p. 69). Hariman and
Lucaties’s (2007) work on imagery employs this assumption in their study of iconic
photographs as a mechanism of democracy. Through the collective act of looking at such
photographs, the individual citizens “imagine” themselves as a community. The potential
for visuals to create and constrain political affiliations is rooted in the inherent affective
power of the image.
For scholars like Hariman, Lucaites, and Mitchell, this theoretical investigation of
visual rhetoric illustrates the pursuit of reconnecting the emotional and the visceral to our
social discourse and argumentation. Hariman and Lucaites note the timeliness of visual
investigation, “the study of various practices of visual representation is booming, so
much so that it seems similar in scope to the ‘linguistic turn’ that expanded across human

	
  

9

sciences in the twentieth century” (2007, p. 5). Mitchell argues that pictures “have always
been with us” and in fact we cannot get beyond them or the emotional elements that they
engage (2005, p. xiv). Mitchell explains that the “pictorial turn” does not mean that
images will replace words. Instead, he argues that the turn should allow us to understand
how pictures and imagery work in conjunction with words in the effort of world-making.
Mitchell writes: “We do not live in a uniquely visual era. The ‘visual or ‘pictorial turn’ is
a recurrent trope that displaces moral and political panic onto images and so-called visual
media” (p. 343). Essentially, the ‘moral’ panic that iconoclasts fear from visuals is rooted
in a widespread fear of emotional appeals as antithetical to productive and democratic
discourse. However, within the realm of citizenship studies it is becoming more difficult
to ignore the emotional impact of visuals and imagery.
In this project I look to Fortier’s definition of affective citizenship which is based
on the argument that affect, more generally described as emotional appeals that are
supported only (or primarily by) affect, is a real and relevant way in which the citizenry
makes political decisions and develops. While a good deal of recent work analyzes
distinctions between affect and emotion, I take a more macro view that looks at affect on
a general level that emphasizes its link with pathos. Throughout my investigation in this
project, this position, allows me to examine the intersections between pathos, visual
imagery, and the construction of citizenship. Further, it positions me to draw from the
competing narratives of logos and pathos and examine their tensions, rather than
becoming entrenched in theoretical arguments directly defining pathos.
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To illustrate this tension, I provide a brief synopsis of logos’ rise to dominance in
western societies and pathos’ concomitant denigration. The first is the narrative of a
citizen constructed and motivated through purely logos-centric, rationalized discourse.
The second is a story that recognizes and appreciates the pathetic potential for
investigation into the motivations and affiliations of the citizenry.
The Adventures of Logos and Pathos
“Within Western culture, McKerrow (1998) explains, the dichotomy between
reason and emotion has a long and deeply ingrained history” (Miller & McKerrow, 2001,
p. 43). Dominant Western philosophies have treated reason as the absence of emotion and
vice versa. The current negative connotation of the term “pathetic” is representative of
mainstream aversion to the concept and utilization of pathos. The etymology of the word
pathetic reveals that the term originally had a much more positive connotation and
acquired the negative valence much later. The Greek word pathētikos meaning “sensitive,”
evolved by the 16th century to mean, “affecting the emotions” (Oxford Dictionaries,
2013).
In Plato’s work, The Republic, he went to great length to separate emotion from
reason, going so far as to accuse emotion as capable of corrupting reason. For his part,
Aristotle offered a nuanced, if hesitant, defense of pathos by recognizing it as a rhetorical
proof alongside logos and ethos, thus suggesting that pathos has substantive value.
However, throughout his work in On Rhetoric as well as his relegation of much of his
investigation of pathos to drama in Poetics, he ended up lending suspicion to pathos as
separate from logos in its legitimacy. This suspicion gained steam in the reign of the
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Enlightenment when philosophers sought means to disempower the church by prioritizing
logos over the faith that was the foundation of the church’s power. This evolution of
meaning coincides with the preference for the concept of man as primarily a rational
creature. The denigration of pathos within reasoned thought continued until it came to
indicate inadequacy or arousing of pity.
The journey through which the rhetorical proof of logos managed to discredit the
rhetorical proof of pathos has an arch that spans over twenty-six hundred years. This
particular narrative has had implications throughout a range of scholarly endeavors, most
notably rhetoric, philosophy, political science, and economics. Although this narrative is
chronologically expansive in both scope and depth, historical analysis is key to a
contemporary understanding of these concepts.
The first of these relates to Plato’s (in)famous critique of the Sophists as relying
on ornamentation and false guarantees of eloquence to leading members of Ancient
Greece in order to ingratiate themselves with power (Plato, 2009). Plato’s critique
stemmed from his conception of the relation between idea and object as illustrated in his
devotion to his ontologically driven “Theory of Forms.” Through his philosophical
perspective, Plato would produce a series of famous dialogues that worked to discredit
the need for pathos in intellectual and civic life. These dialogues primarily took on the
form of Plato voicing the protagonist, Socrates, as he sets off on voyages that cross paths
with Sophists. Socrates takes on the role of the proverbial gadfly in that he wages a series
of questions challenging Sophists to defend their position on rhetoric. Ultimately, this
method results in the Sophists in the dialogues contradicting and questioning themselves,
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reaffirming Plato’s critique of rhetoric as unnecessary ornamentation that distorts logos
and rationality1.
Although Sophistry persisted as a trade, Plato’s dialogues created damage to the
reputation of the profession and philosophical perspective. It was not until a student of
Plato’s, Aristotle, offered his work in On Rhetoric in which he declared rhetoric a
counterpart or handmaiden of the dialectic, (Aristotle, 2004). Aristotle sought to find the
median point between Sophistic practice and Platonic thought by locating pathos among
the rhetorical proofs. As “the counterpart of dialectic,” rhetoric operates in the space
beyond the pure logic of dialectical reasoning. Aristotle identified three artistic proofs in
rhetoric: ethos (credibility), pathos (emotion), and logos (logic or words). Aristotle
defined pathos as “all those feelings that so change men as to affect their judgments, and
that are also attended by pain or pleasure” (1378a). However, Aristotle’s attempt to
identify a middle ground between the philosophies of Plato and the Sophists was
weakened by an account of emotion that lacked depth and scope. It was his extensive
attention to logos and its rhetorical devices that led philosophers to argue Aristotle gave
preference to logos over pathos in his conception of persuasion.
While the logos-centric narrative was initially popularized in Ancient Greece
through the works of Plato, the logos-centric ‘hammer’ that would denigrate the role of
pathos would not drop until the Enlightenment. This period of ‘enlightenment’ was
characterized by rapid intellectual growth in the western world and so the shift to a
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dominant status for logos became built-in to much of the ontological and epistemological
positions, inherent to the rise of interest in science, that remain prevalent in our society to
this day. The logos-centric paradigm demanded that our “proper” forms of formal
argument be acquired through an elite education that was accessible to few in society.
The period gained its prominence in France, but quickly spread across the
Western world. Members of the Enlightenment pondered ontologically driven questions,
dealing with the nature of being, similar to the preceding work of Plato in The Republic,
in that they sought the “essence” of man as a means for understanding how man should
be governed. Prominent amongst the members of the Enlightenment was the work of
John Locke; a political philosopher who’s had well known and profound influence on the
future founding fathers of the United States. Like Plato, Locke argued that rationality or
reason formed the “essence” of man, as it differentiated humans from animals. For Locke,
reason was intimately connected to the concept of logos in that both center on the
capacity of the mind to act as an “eye” in the pursuit of truth by assessing and connecting
ideas through an “accurate” perception. In essence, Weedon (1970) reports that Locke
argued for a conception of mental processes akin to mathematical processing (p. 386).
The ideas of Locke and his contemporaries would be codified into the philosophies of
law and economics through the construction of future constitutions of countries like
France, as well as in economic systems of western countries dedicated to the principles of
capitalism.
Rhetoric would also be influenced by this wave of rationality, particularly with
respect to the practice of argumentation and its relation to democracy. The value that a
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society has placed on logos is particularly salient when considering the communicative
means through which democratic governments have been constructed, particularly in the
examination of debate as a means of democracy. This value is readily seen in the
construction of theories related to the role of public discourse in supporting democracy
that preference logos as the foundation for rational decision-making. Traditional theorists
of argumentation have insisted on a preference for logos in delineating “productive”
means of argumentation, and by extension logos became preferred as the primary means
for representation and inclusion in the public sphere.
Argumentation studies have flourished alongside democratic ideals since ancient
Greek times. In an ideal democracy, citizens are civically engaged in public
deliberation about their common concerns. People advance rational arguments to
solve problems and sustain democratic governance (Aguayo
& Steffensmeier, 2008, p. 1).
The presumption of rationality among men led to a restriction on women in politics as
well a modern day fascination with the concept of form in argumentation. Following this
trend Miller & McKerrow (2001) explained that emotions have too often been deemed
argumentative fallacies that distract the audience from the policy or issue at hand by
placing the argument in direct relation to the to the speaker and society in general. The
Toulmin (1958) model of argumentation serves as a prominent example of form in
argumentation as the model operates as an instrument for the invention, evaluation, and
criticism of an argument’s strength. Brockriede and Ehninger popularized Toulmin’s
model in the United States, among rhetoricians, in a 1960 essay in which they concurred,
“If one assumes some rationality among men, a system of logical treatment of argument
is imperative” (p. 113; Marcus, 2002). Brockriede and Ehninger utilized Toulmin’s
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model to critique classical structures of argument, including the enthymeme and
syllogism, as being insufficient to capture modern day argumentation.
Resurrection of Pathos
While logos remains a dominant force in philosophical, economic, and political
pursuits, lacunae in logos’ ability to understand and improve the human condition has
gained prominence. Parallel to logos-centric argumentation, pathos oriented theory says
that the problematic nature of this binary is mirrored at the social level. This claim has
been prominently examined in the contemporary work of mainstream public affairs
writers and cognitive scientists like Westen (2007) and Lakoff (2009). Scholars across
disciplines have agreed that, to some degree at least, humans are by nature emotional
creatures. Acceptance of this position would label the modern search for rationality
without emotion in public decision-making as unnatural. As Westen (2007) put it,
“Feeling and thinking evolved together, and nature ‘designed’ them to work
together…Emotions not only provide much of the ‘fuel’ that fires up our engines. They
also provide most of the brake fluid” (p. 51).
This view of emotion as motivation solidifies an emerging consensus amongst
rhetoricians, psychologists, sociologists, and political scientists that rationality is static in
nature and so needs emotion to perpetuate action. Berezin (2001), focusing on the
creation of political identities, credits emotion as a catalyst for political action and the
construction/reconstruction of identities of citizenship. “Emotion is the pivot upon which
political action turns. It is a vehicle of political learning that has the capacity to create
new identities” (p. 93). These “new identities” Berezin attributes to political emotion
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become the basis of citizenship. He explains that “Emotion is nonrational but it is not
irrational. Emotion obliterates prior identities. It fuses self and other, subject and object,
the ontological and epistemological” (93). The fusion of self and other is the very process
by which a social contract may come into existence, and it is through the fusion of the
ontological and the epistemological that who or what we are comes to shape our ability
for how and what we know.
Recent critical scholarship has taken up the mantle of exposing the oppressive
tendencies of a logos-centric world by focusing on how emotions, as explained through
embodied experiences, are imbedded into our public discourse. It is through this
exploration that pathos is making a comeback and it has the potential to disrupt our
practical and theoretical understandings of the role of emotion in representing the state to
the people and the people to the state. This process has led to a dominant logos being
“built in” to our social structures and discourses, especially in discourses concerning the
nature of argument, citizenship, gender, and the body.
The difficulty of containing the intricacies of emotion in a modernist
argumentative structure discouraged early argumentation theorists from integrating
emotion into their models and types of arguments. While there are theorists like
Perelman2 and Fisher3 who relied on audience premises as grounds for argument, for
many their discipline and training precludes them from highlighting emotion4. Essentially,
pathetic elements of argumentation are recognized in argumentation theory, but rarely are
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these elements as fully flushed out as more logos centric ideas. However, a resurgence of
this effort may be on the horizon. Miller and McKerrow’s (2001) work represents a
growing frustration with the either/or approach to logos and pathos. In their work on
argument in presidential campaign discourse the scholars recognized the futility of this
move when trying to understand how the populace is persuaded in the political realm, as
well as the critical implications from this stance. They argued for a both/and approach to
the binary by stating, “Separating these as ‘reason only’ and ‘emotion only’ neglects the
possibility that emotion carries its own logic, and that reason needs emotion to move the
soul to action” (44). This project echoes McKerrow’s eloquent call for a reversal of this
“logic” by arguing, “We need a society in which reason and emotion are valued, each in
their own right, and for what they bring to the occasion. To do otherwise is to imprison
ourselves in the narrow confines of an impersonal, mind-centered discourse that trammels
the soul’s recognition of its own humanity” (p. 325).
The assumption that logos-centric rationality is the natural condition of man
resulted in overly rationalized constructions of social systems like citizenship. Of great
concern to any legal conception of citizenship is the way in which it fed the preferential
imbalance of the individual over the community. Bellamy (2008) argues this point
succinctly:
According to the Aristotelian ideal, political citizenship had depended on being
freed from the burdens of economic and social life-both in order to participate and
to ensure that public rather than private interests were the main concern. By
contrast, legal citizenship has private interest and their protection at heart. (p. 39)
Implicit in Bellamy’s contention is that private interest in the logos-centric world
operates through a rationalized form of self-interest, wherein the individual will only
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adhere to the community’s needs if they align with his or her own. This is illuminating
because if it is accepted that rationalized self-interest is a legitimate primary motivation,
then this system serves to secure resources to the elite and further marginalize other
sectors of society. This preference for rationality in the political realm was constructed
through a need to exclude emotion from public life, emotional appeals being more
accessible to the masses, for fear that with emotion comes bias and inevitable insurrection
against elite forces. The following historical review explains the role of monarchy in this
transformation.
“At its most general level, citizenship refers to full membership in the community
in which one lives,” but in practice it is the ability of a citizen to exercise that citizenship
in the public realm that is important (Glenn p. 19). In Habermas’s (1991) study of the
origins and creation of the contemporary public sphere, he primarily focused on the
formation and transformation of the public sphere. He described the process through
which individual citizens may come together through homogenous, rationalized debate.
Of concern for Habermas’s pre-industrialization public sphere was the need for logosdriven, rational thought in public deliberation.
The primary issue with Habermas’s view and the logos-centric paradigm as a
whole is that it limits entrance into the power-center of society to only those with the
education and/or resources that could reveal to them the “rules” of how to speak, live,
and look in a “rational” or “civilized” manner. This ends up excluding large sectors of
societies from input into governmental oversight and so contradicts the goals of
democratic governance.
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Another issue with a logos only perspective is the paradox that arises out of
liberal democratic citizenship. Essentially, this paradox is that although our democracy is
said to rely on a logos-centric, rationally educated populace, studies have found that
many parts of the populace do not meet this standard. These scholars have found through
examination little reason that our system should survive, “As critics focus on the
conceptual defects of liberal citizenship, they generally refrain from asking why the
liberal polity fails to fail as predicted, enduring and even thriving despite what appear to
be irreparable flaws” (Kaplan, 2010, p. 2). This scholarship works to question one of the
fundamental positions of modern democratic citizenship: that it should reject emotional
decision-making.
In opposition to the idea of the rational democratic citizen, recent scholarship has
promoted a citizen that blends pathos with logos. I label this contrasting concept of
citizenship the “pathetic citizen.” It is important to note that the pathetic citizen is not
conceived as a person devoid of rationality, but instead a person concurrently driven by
reason and emotion to conduct the work of citizenship. Marcus (2002) argues “that
people are able to be rational because they are emotional; emotions enable
rationality…rationality is a special set of abilities that are recruited by emotion systems in
the brain to enable us to adapt to the challenges that daily confront us” (p. 7). Adopting
Marcus’ perspective offers a much more optimistic assessment of the state of the
democratic citizen as he proffers the conclusion that “the current practice of citizenship is
demonstrably far more accomplished, far more rational, even while being more emotional,
than is generally observed” (p. 7). Further, DeLuca (2008) argues that imagery and
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emotion operate in a manner similar to an enthymeme in that they “shift the responsibility
of argument construction to the audience” thereby promoting engagement from the
citizenry (p. 317). Understanding this position requires a reconsideration of the
constitutive role of emotion in reuniting the mind and body of citizen.
As previously articulated, Habermas’s idea of rational deliberation in the public
sphere barred entrance for much of society. Although he identifies public discourse as
productive dialogue among citizens, this designation did not include women and
minorities. The justification for this exclusion lies in the idea that public discourse is
purely rational and thus “justified” the exclusion of minority groups that were thought to
lack this ability in comparison to moneyed, white, men.
The implications of the pathetic paradigm shift are illuminated by the way it
promotes inclusivity by allowing different sectors of society to gain representation in our
public sphere. For example, scholars recognize the way in which the demoralization of
emotional argument mirrored the subjugation of women from the public sphere. “The
dichotomy is further complicated by its reference to gender, wherein males are the
privileged users of rational talk, while women are relegated to the inferior stance in
expressing ideas through emotion” (p. 43). This critical stance reveals the way in which
rationality, when positioned in opposition to emotion, has become a hegemonic weapon.
A weapon that has been wielded over time to recognize only the preferred members of
society that have traditionally had access to elite schooling in logic as taught by other
members of the favored class.
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Feminist scholars like Berlant directly addressed the problematic exclusivity of
the Habermasian model of the public sphere by arguing the division of the public and
private spheres has only served to create a private sphere depository for women’s issues
so that they can be excluded from the public sphere. Basically, the pre-industrialized
salon culture of France, which Habermas praised, can only work when a homogenous
sector of society is the only voice allowed into the salon. In contrast, working to make
pathetic discourse acceptable in public increases power for the marginalized voices in the
citizenry.
As Glenn (2002) explains, the notion of the citizen came into existence on the
global landscape as monarchies begin to fall to democratic institutions. It was in this
transition that the importance of regulating and managing the monarch’s body transferred
to the importance of regulating the body of the individual citizenship for the productive
purposes of society. In the context of the logos-centric model the “civilized body” is a
formulaic construction created through the means of the scientific method in order to gain
the power to “diagnose” a body as abnormal that does not meet the needs of the state.
From this perspective, a body is defined medically and scientifically through standardized
tests and measurements; like skin color, height, weight, and the infamous BMI scale
(Gilman, 2010).
The physical body of a member of the state has been of concern dating back to the
monarchial periods wherein the king’s body acted as conduit for representation of the
power of the state and the security of the citizens. When the monarchial system collapsed,
this potential for the physical body to act as a synecdoche for the “health” of the nation
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was disseminated to the citizenry as a whole. The dominant western logos-centric
conception of the body is that it is an entity to be examined, constrained, contained, and
ultimately disciplined to meet the needs of the state. This notion that the body can and
should act as a visual marker for social qualities like class, status, virtue, and discipline
has created many problems for individuals and society in general. The binary led to the
celebration of the mind as the locus for logos and was translated into notions of
citizenship in the form of the civilized body, of which Farrell writes, “the citizen and
expressions of citizenship have been circumscribed both discursively as well as
materially through a limiting construction of the civilized body to reveal the validity of
the argument that…the [concept of the] ‘civilized body’ is alive, well and dangerous”
(2011, p. 116). Basically, a logos-centric conception of the body of a citizen focuses on
the normalization of that body, by identifying and marginalizing bodies that deviate from
this standpoint
The connection between citizenship and the body is centered in discourses that
relate to the definition and the exercise of citizenship in American society, and speak to
the productive power of the rhetoric of citizenship. In monarchial times the king was able
to dictate through royal fiat, but democratic leaders needed the consent of the people and
so had to seek additional means of persuasion. Post the dissolution of the monarchies the
binary between rationality and emotion ceased to make sense as a governing philosophy.
For instance, the binary that places the body and the mind in conflict with each other
became insufficient to understand the modes of power the head of the state would utilize
to exert control over the populace. Foucault’s work on biopower illuminates the way in
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which the tactic of surveillance operates through the populace’s constant fear of having
their body and actions observed. Agency can be found in the counterpoint of this fear, by
the action of the individual displaying their body so that t can be seen on display.
However, viewing the body from this perspective does not directly account for the
power dynamics inherent to the observer-object relationship of observation. Foucault
prolifically wrote of the powers that create and constrain the “civilized body.” In
Power/Knowledge (1980) Foucault argues in an interview that in order to understand the
body we must ask the question, “What mode of investment of the body is necessary and
adequate for the functioning of a capitalist society like ours?” (p. 58). Foucault dubbed
the investment of power onto the body as bio-power, a form of social power that political
philosophy has traditionally overlooked. Of this power, Foucault (1990) writes that
modern nation states have turned from an era of regulating death to an era, “characterized
[by] a power whose highest function was perhaps no longer to kill, but to invest life
through and through” (p. 139). Further, this move constituted “an explosion of numerous
and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugation of bodies and the control of
populations, marking the beginning of an era of “bio-power”” (p. 140).
For McKerrow and other critical scholars, rhetorical studies can be instrumental
in understanding this rhetorical shift due to its capacity to represent the interaction
between reason and emotion through an embodied performance. Several prominent
rhetorical studies have demonstrated this point through their examination of the use of
bodies as political protest. In Morris and Sloop’s 2006 work on the politics of queer
public kissing they articulate the political nature of this act as kairotic, which creates a
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crisis from which new attitudes may be created. The kairos of this act is imbued with
emotion for both the actor and the spectator; it is through that emotional response that
Morris and Sloop see the potential for political and cultural change.
Similarly, DeLuca’s (2008) examination of body rhetoric of groups like “Earth
First!, Act Up, and Queer Nation”, submits that, “vulnerable bodies, dangerous bodies,
taboo bodies, ludicrous bodies, transfigured bodies…constitute a nascent body rhetoric
that deploys bodies as a pivotal resource for the crucial practice of public argumentation”
(p. 10). Achter (2010) extended DeLuca’s work to examine the way in which the bodies
of veterans of war communicate in the public sphere. “Veterans of wars in Afghanistan
and Iraq with visually identifiable injuries possess ‘unruly’ bodies that render the story of
war in efficient, emotional terms” (p. 46). DeLuca and Achter’s works support the notion
that there is something emotional and disruptive about bodies, and how that power can be
utilized by marginalized communities. However, much of the scholarship on the
emotional power of bodies has centered on the use of this strategy by a counterpublic,
and so has ignored the interaction between the center and the margins of society through
the insertion of body rhetoric in the public sphere. This lacunae in the literature related to
body rhetoric is reinforced by an examination of the role of pathos in public sphere
argumentation. DeLuca (2008) wrote of what he dubbed “unruly arguments,” and argued
“image events are a form of postmodern argumentative practice, a kind of oppositional
argument that creates social controversy, and animates and widens possibilities for debate”
(p. 315). DeLuca’s premise mirrors a strong argument for the pathetic dimension of
public argumentation because the image can entice the viewer and invoke emotions that
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disrupt current modes of thinking, ultimately making space for alternative ways of
thinking. Essentially, image events are arguments that seek to start a controversy rather
than offer immediate resolution. This idea of gaining agency through disruptive image
events does not fit into the logos-centric, modernist way of understanding public
discourse, and so is calling for a shift through which visual challenges to the system can
be understood as not only rational, but potentially effective.
In summation, the work On Rhetoric by Aristotle conceptualized emotions as
pathos and placed them on the same plane as logos and ethos with respect to the creation
of persuasion. The impact of this act was dissolved throughout the Renaissance as a
means for allowing the elite to remain in power through discourse control of the woman
or man, their respective bodies, and the status that those bodies hold in society. However,
recent critical work in rhetorical theory has revealed cracks in the once smooth veneer of
the logos-centric perspective. The exclusivity of the logos-centric perspective is
illuminated by work focusing on the margins of society and the way in which they
interact with the hegemonic center. Deluca’s conception of unruly arguments and
Foucault’s examination of the pseudo-logical means through which we brand and dismiss
unwanted members of our society, and our growing understanding of the rhetorical
impact of citizenship have all served to highlight the need for a paradigm shift. However,
in order to navigate the implications of this shift, and cultivate a more expansive study of
politics, we must first reexamine our understanding of reasoning and emotion.
Pathos, Logos, and Political Rhetoric
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Despite the field’s traditionalist impulses, scholars of political rhetoric have
recently recognized the impact of this paradigm shift. Stuckey (2010) argued for a
“rethinking” of the concept of the rhetorical presidency because “this model assumes a
white male president who governs within a pre-cable, pre-internet, political context” (p.
38). Further, she suggested that “There are too few studies of the embodied presidency
and there are productive possibilities in melding the study of the rhetorical presidency
with other areas in the field” (p. 49). Stuckey’s call to expand our understanding of the
presidency beyond formulaic conceptions of speech acts leads this project to search for
an alternative to our understanding of political rhetorical power because it has been
limited by a logos-centric perspective that does not allow for the recognition and
appreciation of the pathetic perspective.
The concept of the rhetorical presidency emerged in the 1980’s and has produced
a broad range of scholarship in the study of communication, history, and political science.
Tulis (1987) argues that the rhetorical presidency is a twentieth-century phenomenon,
broadly utilized by President Wilson in his effort to give coherence to public policy by
communicating with “the people.” Implicit to Tulis’ understanding of this 20th-century
phenomenon, is the suggestion that previous presidents, specifically from the 19th century,
had expressed some sort of aversion to popular and pathetic rhetoric. While Tulis’ work
focused on the potential detrimental effects of pathetic appeals on deliberative
democracy; communication scholars have readily adopted and proceeded to build from
the notion that the primary source of power for a president is his or her own rhetoric.
However, I argue that our conception of presidential rhetoric is too circumscribed. In
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order to better understand the rich complexity of presidential rhetoric I contend that we
need to come to look at presidential power as more than just the rhetorical work of the
president, and instead to work to expand the analysis to other rhetorical actors in the
administration, including the first lady. This pursuit has the potential to collapse the
binary between logos and pathos that discriminates against women by legitimizing pathos,
and ultimately empower a different model of citizenship.
Putting a Rhetorical Lens on the First Lady
The traditional view of the United States presidency as espoused by Caroli (1987)
argues that it “includes two jobs that are performed by separate individuals in other forms
of representative governments: a head of state who presides over ceremonial functions
and a head of government who makes major appointments and takes a decisive role in
legislation” (p. xviii). However, recent technological and cultural, shifts have necessitated
that the first lady become the prime purveyor of the ceremonial function. Just as these
jobs are allocated by position and gender they are also circumscribed by the persuasive
appeals they are expected to emphasize. As the head of state, the president is expected to
symbolize his control and power through a logos-centric hyper-masculinized
performance. As the presidential counterpart, and de facto ceremonial head of state, the
first lady is expected to emphasize her femininity in order to avoid the perception that she
is emasculating the president. Appeals from the first lady have traditionally been and will
continue to relate to her status as a mother, a woman in love, and a caretaker. This
situation has led presidents to offer their wives as a surrogate for their approval and as a
symbol for their control over their government. In effect, if the body of the president is
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viewed as a reflection of the thoughtful decision-making role of the American people,
then he is expected to focus on the cerebral, logos-based tasks, leaving the first lady to
embody and represent the pathetic, ceremonial values of the American people.
However, Marton (2001) argues the ceremonial role is “more than style, hairdos,
White House décor, inaugural gowns, controversies over china, and guest lists. Instead
she states that the role of presidential spouses is vital to a full understanding of their
husbands’ administrations and the presidency itself” as the first lady serves as “a link to
the real world from which his power and position isolate him” (pp. 3-4). Central to
understanding the interpretive role of the first lady is an examination of the way in which
the concept of the rhetorical presidency finds its pathetic counterpart in the role of the
first lady. Studies on the function and role of the first lady have adopted the role of the
rhetorical president as a tool to assess the power of the office. Parry-Giles and Blair
(2002) argue that the rhetorical rise of the first lady is a “path that at once holds a
symbiotic relationship with the rhetorical presidency yet is unique in its own rhetorical
path and substance”(p. 566). Essentially, that the Office of the First Lady (OFL) has a
rhetorical function that operates primarily from a site of pathetic discourse allowing the
first lady to access the negotiation of cultural values among the citizenry.
However, the office is different in substance and style. The Constitution does not
allocate substantive or specific duties to the OFL, so the position has only been defined
through institutional custom and cultural expectations. Most important of those customs
and expectations is that messages disseminated from the OFL should work to support the
overall goals and purposes of the president’s administration. Stylistically, the office
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differs because it is expected to operate as an extension of the feminine private sphere but
it performs in the cultural sphere of public discourse. First ladies are routinely sent out to
commemorations, memorials, dedications, and other rhetorical events that have
constructed the celebrity status of the office in our culture. In order to better understand
the criticisms of the OFL we should look to the specific roles and methods of
containment that this office encounters.
Parry-Giles (2000) explained that women in politics often encounter a “double
bind” in that they are expected to be the purveyor of the private sphere but to represent it
in the public sphere and this leads to a situation in which a “woman [may] become so
powerful they lose their femininity” (p. 208). Hayden (1999) argues that the female
political representative negotiates this paradoxical view of femininity by employing
feminine style, “as a rhetorical strategy, feminine style often reflects rhetors’ efforts to
negotiate the power relations that gender entails” (p. 100). Feminine style is most notably
understood as “a synthesis of form and substance that works to promote an alternative
political philosophy reflecting traditionally feminine values,” essentially it is a style that
promotes participatory action and invokes a personal tone (Dow & Boor Tonn, 1993, p.
287). While some have celebrated the recognition of the utilization and prevalence of
feminine style, others have claimed that this sort of rhetorical compartmentalizing serves
only to further marginalize women. Hayden (1997) questioned whether a form “embraced
by the dominant culture can at the same time serve to challenge that culture” (p. 137).
Parry-Giles (1996) makes clear the limitations of feminine style to lead to female
empowerment, “while most campaign rhetorics exhibit a ‘feminine style’ they
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simultaneously rely upon prevailing masculine values and themes. Instead of resulting in
a feminized political sphere, contemporary campaign rhetorics reflect the continual
marginalization of women in the political process and the general exclusion of women
from political office and political power” (p. 338).
Borrelli (2011) argued, “we know much more about what first ladies have not
done than about what they have consistently and routinely contributed to the presidency”
(p. 2). Borrelli’s statement highlights the prolific yet fragmented nature of a scholarship
that focuses on the role(s) and influence of the first ladies of the United States by looking
past the role of the first lady as purely ornamental and instead contend that the first lady
serves an important representative role in government. “Rather than simply restating or
explaining the president’s words to the public, the first lady takes on the much more
difficult and far riskier task of interpreting one to the other” (p. 211). She goes on to
argue that “he embodies the best of the public sphere; she embodies the best of the
private sphere,” an argument that leads this analysis to examine the way in which the first
lady may act as interpreter between the public and private sphere, thereby collapsing the
dichotomy (p. 5).
Past research has primarily illuminated the way in which first ladies have deviated
from a general understanding of the cultural expectations for their office. In many cases
this has been to the detriment of working toward a greater understanding of the way in
which this office has expanded and changed in modern presidencies. Historically, the first
lady is symbolically considered the “leader of the nation’s women,” a title that supports a
gendered conception of the office itself. Borrelli (2011) argues that, “integral to these
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public expectations and to first lady priorities, are judgments about gender, and gender
role modeling (p. 3),” a fact that is highlighted by the juxtaposition of the first lady to the
office of the president, an office that “gender scholars have concluded is arguably the
most intensely masculine post in the United States government” (p. 2). Interestingly,
Marton (2001) notes how slowly this office has reacted to changing social norms,
“Ironically, while women have been breaking down the last remaining barriers toward
full equality, the first lady’s political role remains circumscribed” (p. 5).
Of primary concern for many is that the first lady’s relationship to power is sexual
in nature due to her marriage to the President, a situation in which patriarchy’s fears of
female sexuality is given room to coalesce. It’s not that the relationship is sexual, but that
patriarchy thinks it is, and it conjures the dominant hegemonic fear of female sexuality.
Many scholars have argued that society fears the “pillow influence” of the first lady,
which includes “behind-the-scenes influence that might come simply from being the
president’s partner, lover, and confidante” (Watson, 1997). In addition, the legitimacy of
the OFL has been called in to question because she is not an elected position and so some
believe she should have no access to power given by the people. However, scholars like
Anderson (2005) offer a more optimistic view of the future of the office of the first lady
as she argues that, “by virtue of their husbands’ elections, first ladies become ‘sites’ for
the symbolic negotiation of female identity” that ultimately work to both “foster and
constrain women’s agency” (Anderson, 2005, p. 2). Anderson further states that past first
ladies “have been able to confound the ambiguities latent in gender dichotomies by
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developing paradox in ways that deconstruct female identity and open possibilities for
political agency” (Anderson, 2005, p. 2).
The first lady’s power for construction and propagation of social and national
meaning lies in her role as a nexus between the president and the public (Borrelli, 2011).
In the past this role has been dismissed as purely ornamental, however the recent
technological advancements have worked to expand the influence of the first lady by the
prolific dissemination of her image. In other words, while it still may require a “slow
news day” for a speech made by the first lady to become prime time news, the image of
the first lady permeates our social and political imagery. For example, Michelle Obama
frequently appears in a variety of media and on the cover of magazines. These
appearances have such a prominent effect on sales that the Harvard Business Review has
coined the term “first lady index:”
Professor David Yermack of NYU’s Stern School found that following 189 public
appearances between November 2008 and December 2009, Michelle Obama
created $2.7 billion in cumulative abnormal returns—value over and above
normal market variations—for fashion and retail companies associated with the
clothes she wore. (The Michelle Obama Effect Slideshow)
Clearly, much of the potential to access the political capital and influence of the
first lady is rooted in the pathetic dimensions derived primarily from the imagery that
surrounds the tension between her private and political roles in the public sphere. But
when pathos is considered to play a greater role in the public, the powers of the president
and the first lady appear more intertwined. I argue that the president has the power to
speak about American life in front of the public, but the first lady is uniquely positioned
to embody the power to live the American life in front of the public.
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Therefore the central question is not whether the OFL has power, but through
what rhetorical means can the OFL utilize it, regardless of the patriarchal insecurities that
have traditionally been suspicious of this possibility. More specifically, these criticisms
illustrate the pervasive fear that the rationalized, masculine, logos-centered Office of the
President may be defiled or contaminated by the emotional, pathetic nature of the Office
of the First Lady. Setting these concerns aside raises the question, “What are we missing
when we evaluate the Office of the First Lady through only her logo-centric connection
to power and influence and marginalize the pathetic appeal of her political discourse?”
To engage this question, I propose to examine the rhetorical role that Michelle Obama
has played during the Obama Administration.
The Rhetoric and Policy of the Obama Administration
Following the election of President Barack Obama the effort of obtaining his key
campaign promise of healthcare reform faced the obstacle of operating in a changing
political environment due to recent technological changes for political rhetoric. Despite
the acknowledgement of the power of the “bully pulpit” for the president, changing
technological circumstances have served to undermine this political action. Starr (2011)
explains that in the 60’s and 70’s nearly half of the American populace watched
presidential addresses, “but with the explosion in the number of channels in the 1980’s,
the TV audience splintered, and presidents had to compete with entertainment” (p. 221).
For the 44th President Barack Obama and his pledge to fulfill his campaign promise of
overhauling healthcare this was particularly daunting. Starr (2011) reports “Fifty-two
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million people watched his first [healthcare] address in February, but on September 9, the
audience was down to 32 million” (p. 221).
Further complicating the Obamas’ administrative objective was the controversial
nature of healthcare reform in the United States. For the past hundred years, starting with
President Theodore Roosevelt, presidents have attempted some modicum of expanding
healthcare in the United States with the results being largely unsuccessful. The core
problem seemed that the value systems embedded in the discourse surrounding universal
healthcare appeared antithetical to American individualism. This contention was
crystallized in public discourse by claims that an overhaul of healthcare would be
tantamount to socialism. For the Obamas and their supporters, these claims were
compounded by personal and radicalized attacks questioning the president’s legitimacy.
Amidst this controversy, and perhaps because of it, President Obama instructed his
speechwriters to focus on the economics of healthcare:
After a month of fear and anger, the president needed to restate the moral case for
health-care reform. A few months earlier, in June, when Obama addressed the
American Medical Association, he has told his speechwriters to focus on cost
containment, and in the speech itself he has mentioned the uninsured only toward
the end. (Starr, 2011, p. 222)
Although Barack Obama read letters from the uninsured and sick in each of his
appearances in support of the bill, the central rhetoric focused on an economic rationality.
His rhetoric served as a call to ignore the heated emotions of the moment, and attune
ourselves to the political realities of the present and future. Ultimately, the Affordable
Care Act (ACA) would pass both legislatures and be signed into law by President Obama
on March 23, 2010. However, the law would not include many elements that the
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Obama’s democratic base had wanted. In the end, Barack Obama was successful at
getting a version of the ACA into law but the controversy would live on because the
ACA left much of the responsibility for implementation to the states. The ensuing
discourse would reveal that although President Obama had signed the bill into law, many
still questioned the law as being antithetical to American values. Expanding our
understanding of the rhetorical presidency and the sources of presidential influence to
include the first lady helps explain First Lady Michelle Obama’s rhetorical role in
supporting her husband’s initiatives.
Much of Michelle Obama’s involvement in the healthcare debate centered upon
her “Let’s Move!” anti-obesity campaign. The first lady officially launched her campaign
in 2010 with a speech in which she set a goal of eliminating childhood obesity within a
generation. In the ensuing years since Michelle Obama’s speech and the Task Force’s
report, the campaign has prominently relied upon political imagery produced by
numerous visits to school cafeterias across the nation, a plethora of photo opportunities in
the White House garden, and even physical fitness challenges with celebrities like Ellen
DeGeneres and Jimmy Fallon. What has stood out rhetorically in this messaging, whether
it is the first lady doing push-ups on daytime television or running through an obstacle
course with Fallon in the White House, is that the visual melding of cultural to political
mirrors the way in which we are being called upon to transcend the individual and join
the American collective of citizenry.
What was particularly notable about this presentation was the way in which the
very body and presence of Michelle Obama served to underscore her proposed cultural
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and political changes. Her body first earned attention in the media in 2009 when she
chose to wear a sleeveless dress, an outfit that highlighted her well sculpted upper arms in
her official White House portrait. In response to this event newspaper columnist David
Brooks wrote, “She’s made her point. Now she should put away Thunder and
Lightning…she should not be known for her physical presence” (Farrell, 2011, p. 135).
Since that initial controversy, Michelle Obama’s physical body has had a consistent
presence in arguments and commentary related to the first lady’s role in the White House
and more importantly to her role as a spokeswoman for anti-obesity efforts. I argue that
insertion of her own body as evidence for her campaign represents an emerging topos, or
traditional rhetorical form, in first lady rhetoric.
In order to examine the claim that the influence of the first lady lies in her ability
to operate as a site for cultural negotiation we now shift to an understanding of the power
of the visual. I turn to an analysis of images of Michelle Obama. Examining the first
lady’s anti-obesity initiative as part of the Obama Administration’s healthcare campaign
provides a unique circumstance to better understand the way the OFL can assist the
president in addressing the public through the means of visual rhetoric. These initiatives
are unique in that the Obamas’ healthcare campaign combined the President’s logoscentric rhetoric advocating a piece of legislation with the first lady’s affective rhetoric
promoting cultural awareness primarily through the use of her body as evidence. I do not
argue that the president and the first lady solely used either logos-centric or affective
reasoning, but rather suggest that an analysis of their individual approaches, such as
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Michelle Obama’s emphasis of image events over public speeches, is an endeavor that
will allow access to her pathetic potential.
Reading Protocol
The pathetic realm allows the First Lady to embody and visually represent the
American citizen to the citizenry. A central problem with addressing this realm of
political identity and argumentation is its experiential nature. In the pathetic dimension,
meaning is primarily produced and reproduced within the boundaries of the political
ritual and direct engagement. Despite this dilemma several scholars have found
themselves ‘seeking’ the affective/emotional in the political realm through avenues such
as performance studies, social movement analysis, and most instructive for this project;
the study of visual rhetoric (Berezin, 2001; Hariman & Lucaites, 2007; Taylor, 2007). I
provide a way of negotiating the terrain between these voices and traditional
understandings of the form and function of political rhetoric.
Olson (2007) explains “In the United States, research into visual rhetoric has
flourished in colleges and universities for over half a century now,” the resulting fifty
plus years of scholarship produced new terminologies, controversies, and an appreciation
for the potential of the visual image as a rhetorical force (p. 1). At the heart of these
critiques is the ontological question of what an image “is.” This is a central question
because it guides the way in which a rhetorical critic will approach and read a rhetorical
situation. However, I employ Mitchell’s (2005) broad perspective on defining images to
the point where the ontological question becomes superfluous. Instead, the question
becomes epistemological and questions what an image “does.” “By “image” I mean any
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likeness, figure, motif, or form that appears in some medium or other” (2005, p. xiii). The
utility of this position is that when we release ourselves from the burden of circular
ontological reasoning we may then be able to illuminate the rhetorical power of images as
they exist in relation to the spectator. For Mitchell, this raises the question “what do
images want, and what do we want from them?”
A particularly compelling thesis in Mitchell’s work is the idea that images are
feminine, because it illuminates the pathetic potential of imagery. Mitchell argues of “our
wish to penetrate [images] and our fear of being swallowed up by them. (I trust that
there’s no reason for me to comment on the heavy quotient of what is called male fantasy
in this scene)” (2005, p. xvii). Mitchell’s positioning of the image as occupying a similar
position to archaic conceptions of the female as a siren, full of desire and emotion that
can corrupt the male rationality is a position that recognizes the allure of the image as
well as the way it may be susceptible to misuse and abuse. His eroticization and
personification of images speaks to the idea that images have the capability to exert
power, but that capability is only realized by the manner in which we treat them. This is
most clearly opined in Mitchell’s contention that the image wants to transfix the spectator,
but only for a moment because the next step is mobilization.
In essence, this contention likens the “power” of images to a conception of the
female mourning her “castration” in the public sphere, in that the image exists through its
appeals to emotion but lacks what it wants. It requires spectators to bring the element of
rationality through their own interpretation mechanisms. The image is at its most
powerful when it can “transfix” the spectator and offer a lens or a frame to interpret the
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world. Given our gendered conception of the OFL, this idea poses compelling questions
for this study by questioning both the way we utilize images of Michelle Obama and the
way in which rhetorical scholars approach the study of the first lady.
The process of seeking images in civic life reveals that it is the multiplicity of
meanings that emanate from imagery that make them particularly useful for creating and
communicating social knowledge. This knowledge is dependent on the images’ ability to
be seen and experienced through an affective dimension by the spectator. It is this work
of ‘seeing’ that raises the potential of imagery to construct and reconstruct conceptions of
the citizen and citizenship as a whole. Hariman & Lucaites (2002) explain that the key to
the process of visuals communicating social knowledge is the “capacity for reflexivity;
appropriations of an iconic image activate a range of emotions and attitudes without
violating the aura of the original” (p. 381).
In summary, in order to interrogate the pathetic potential of first lady rhetoric I
take a broad perspective of what an image is and focus on the interaction it promotes with
and among spectators. This protocol was constructed with the goal of gaining information
on the pathetic and experiential potential of imagery to create, negotiate, and disseminate
social/civic knowledge.
This project aims at addressing several questions that have direct pertinence for
our political system as well as our understanding of rhetorical appeals and messaging. A
central question to this investigation is what are the dangers and advantages involved in
utilizing emotional appeals in the political/public realms? Political pundits and scholars
alike have recognized the American conservative Right’s recent and effective utilization

	
  

40

of emotional appeals to mobilize their socially conservative base. The political left has
been particularly reticent to adopt the same tactics under the assumption that emotionbased appeals do not fit with their “pure” or logical appeals for public policy.
A case study of Michelle Obama’s initiatives allows exploration of how modern
technology has advanced the form and function of political emotional appeals. A
technologically optimistic perspective would assume that our social systems will
naturally evolve or adapt to advancements in a manner that prevents the degradation of
our deliberative system. However, several prominent scholars from across the
disciplinary plane suggest otherwise. It is from this context arises the important question
of what means become available for institutional politicians and the citizenry to construct
and counter emotional appeals in the policy making realm. More specifically, do pathetic
appeals have the potential to attend to the underlying national/cultural values that are the
foundation of political debate in a way that logos-centric appeals are not? How might this
capability function within a political dialectic plagued by rampant partisanship?
A core goal of this work is to investigate how the visuality of the material body of
a citizen can operate as a site for negotiating citizenship between the people and its
government. It is common to accept the argument that how we see affects the way we
listen and learn about our surrounding sociality. In our very language we can hear
visuality represented. Phrases like “I can see that,” “In the eye of the beholder,” and
numerous other ocular centric cultural idioms represent the authenticity that we attribute
to sight over speech. The pursuit in this project is to examine if the power of authenticity
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or visuality can be a force for constructing the expectations and nature of the American
citizen.
What is clear from empirical observation is that recent communication
technologies have led us to a point where image politics has become more dominant in
our political/public sphere. Although scholars like Goodnight (2008) have criticized the
way in which the personalization of our political discourse has resulted in the degradation
of the public sphere, recent technologies like the twenty-four hour news channels, the
Internet, and handheld social media devices promise that this trend is unlikely to reverse.
Given this position, it is imperative that we come to understand the forces outside of
rationalized debate, especially personalized pathetic appeals that are impacting our
policies as well as our identities as an American people.

	
  

42

CHAPTER 2 THE PATHETIC RHETORICAL REVOLUTION
One of the primary tasks of the previous chapter was to illuminate the historical
narratives that serve to disparage pathos’s rhetorical ethicality. However, the more
burdensome task of integrating pathos into our system of understanding political
judgment remains. I begin that task in this chapter by charting the numerous scholarly
endeavors throughout the years that outline the theoretical struggle to legitimate pathos in
rhetoric. I explore this pursuit of pathos largely through scholarship that examines the
‘original sin’ waged against pathos, a misunderstanding of Aristotle’s conception of the
rhetorical proofs. To contextualize this endeavor within modern democratic life in the
western world I offer parallels of pathos’s denigration to modern suspicions surrounding
the rhetorical ability of the Office of the First Lady.
In democratic life, pathos suffers from two primary hurdles in its struggle for
legitimacy: authenticity and appropriateness. The pervasive fear of demagoguery, an
expressed appeal to the people that draws on emotional appeals instead of rational
appeals, is a predominant obstacle for pathos. This is in large part due to the prevailing
view of a demagogue as a ‘provocateur’ or ‘agitator’ that seeks disruption for the sake of
disruption. Essentially, the demagogue engages in rhetorical discourse for the ancillary
purpose of gaining power rather than a ‘pure,’ i.e. rational, pursuit of the public good.
Just as the ethos of the demagogue is questioned, so too is their means of pathetic
argumentation.
Despite the threat of demagoguery, a distinct set of scholars has emerged to
question this modern conception. What is most revealing in tracing this thread of
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literature is that you do not have to look very far into rhetorical theory to discover
arguments that question our preconceived assumptions of pathos’ inability to meet the
standards of authenticity and appropriateness.
Waddell (1990) questions the utility of the presumption of ‘rational purity’ in our
democratic system and finds that it falls in the face of greater rhetorical scrutiny. “Faced
with the elevated status of logos and the degraded status of pathos, we would do well to
recall that, like appeals to emotion, rational appeals are themselves problematic,”
(Waddell, 1990, p. 382). Further, he draws from Aristotle to remind us that rational
appeals can be just as inauthentic as emotional appeals (Aristotle, 1400b35). Although his
assertion may appear to fall into the precarious trap of tu quoque reasoning, his central
argument serves as a call to avoid the fallacy of false dichotomy. Essentially he is
speaking against a common criticism of pathos, that it can be utilized in an unethical
manner and so should be dismissed, by pointing out that logos can also be utilized in a
problematic manner. For Waddell, when it comes to pathos and logos it is not an
either/or, but instead it is a both/and standard that should be applied.
Second, Waddell argues that rational appeals have a tendency to be tautological in
nature, i.e. that they often are true by necessity. This tendency reduces the utility of logos
in democratic life to discussions of certainties, of which there are few in the realm of
political influence. For instance, the argument that “healthcare is a right,” asserted
without the pathetic backing is tautological in nature because its validity relies solely on
the government’s definition of what is a “right” in the United States. Third, Waddell
argues that although rational appeals may assist us in agreement, they lack the rhetorical
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force to incite action through motivation. He draws from a Hasting Center Report, a nonpartisan bioethics research center established in 1969, to remind us “naked reason can
lead us to morally indefensible conclusions,” (Waddell, 1990, p. 382). For example, with
respect to the healthcare debate during Obama’s administration, a principal conservative
rationalization to deny healthcare reform is the idea that you should only get what you
can pay for. This argument was successful in countering Obama’s argument that our
healthcare crisis is also an economic crisis as republicans were able to agree with the
value of healthcare while at the same time saying “but we can’t afford it.” However,
inject into that debate pathetic arguments, highlighting narratives of ill citizens denied
healthcare, and the dynamics of the debate could be altered. In the face of pathetic
appeals narrating stories of citizens suffering and dying, the response that “we can’t
afford for them not to” does not hold the same weight as it did in the purely logical
argument that the healthcare crisis is an economic and security crisis in the making.
Finally, Waddell turned the argument that pathos is the tool of the demagogue on
its head. He argued that by ignoring the role of emotional appeals in political decisionmaking we might be empowering the demagogue. According to Waddell we empower
the demagogue when we ignore their use of pathetic arguments under the artifice that the
populace will not see them as rational and so dismiss them. Instead, he advocated for the
formation of critical skills to combat this phenomenon:
We must advocate wider acceptance of the role emotional appeals play in publicpolicy formation. Moreover, since some emotional appeals (e.g. appeals to race
and hatred) clearly are destructive of the community, we must develop a clearer
understanding of how we distinguish appropriate from inappropriate emotional
appeals. (Waddell, 1990, p. 382)
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In sum, Waddell takes a stance very similar to the ‘golden mean’ originally articulated by
the theorist he examines to construct his argument, Aristotle. He does not deny the
destructive potential of unethical pathetic discourse, but he recognizes the productive
potential of ethical, i.e. appropriate, pathetic discourse. The concept that supports this
position is also drawn from Aristotle, however vaguely, from the ethical standard of
‘appropriateness.’ In The Rhetoric Aristotle speaks of this standard in relation to style,
“Your language will be appropriate [sic] if it expresses emotion and character, and if it
corresponds to its subject” (1408a, 10). It is notable that Aristotle places pathos (emotion)
directly within his standard of rhetorical ethics. Waddell draws from Aristotle to suggest
that we reject the traditionalist dichotomous mindset of good or bad, and instead focus on
‘what is’ in our political discourse with respect to our understanding of pathos and logos.
Clearly, at least for Waddell and Aristotle, emotion has existed and will continue to exist
in our public discourse, and so requires examination without an assumption of
condemnation.
In advance of Waddell in 1990, classical scholar W. W. Fortenbaugh published a
seminal text Aristotle on Emotion (1975) that sought to reexamine the nature of pathos
through historical analysis. Fortenbaugh’s thesis relied on understanding the importance
of the pathetic debate that occurred in Plato’s Academy, most significantly in how
Aristotle extended it in his works Rhetoric and Topics (Topos). “Members of the
Academy including Aristotle focused upon emotions as distinct from bodily sensations
and bodily drives and tried to explain the involvement of cognition in emotional
response,” (Fortenbaugh, 1975, p. 9). Fortenbaugh argues that contrary to modern
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popular opinion it was Aristotle’s work relating and differentiating rhetoric from the
dialectic that actually served to offer pathos, “a new dignity within rhetorical theory,
dramatic poetry was freed from Platonic charges of corrupting reason” (p. 9).
Fortenbaugh sees Aristotle’s distinction of emotions like ‘anger’ as a desire for
revenge accompanied by pain on account of (dia) “an apparent slight to oneself or to
one’s own, the slight being unjustified (1378a30-2)” (p. 12) as evidence of Aristotle’s
conclusion on the relationship between cognition and emotion. Essentially, Aristotle
construed “thought or belief as the efficient cause of emotion…showing that emotional
response is intelligent behavior open to reasoned persuasion” (p. 17). Essentially, he
argues that Aristotle established emotional acts as intelligent because they are based in
“thought,” which collapsed emotion and reason. “Their belief may be erroneous and their
anger unreasonable, but their behavior is intelligent and cognitive in the sense that it is
grounded upon a belief which may be criticized and even altered by argumentation”
(Fortenbaugh, p. 17).
Fortenbaugh offers an intriguing thesis in his reference of Aristotle’s work,
however he remains vague on how we should pursue the nature of this cognition that
connects pathos to ‘intelligent’ behavior. Scholars outside of rhetorical studies have taken
to examining ‘emotional thinking’ through a scientific approach, as shown in the
popularity of books like George Lakoff’s The Political Mind: A Cognitive Scientist’s
Guide to your Brain and its Politics (2008) and Drew Westen’s The Political Brain: The
Role of Emotion in Deciding the Fate of the Nation (2007). Essentially, these texts argue
that at some point our scientific methodology will advance to the point that scientists can
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measure and chart emotion acting in and on the brain. This idea operates as a kind of antirhetoric in that is answers the critique that science is rhetorical by responding rhetoric is
science. However, for this scientific pursuit to have a future requires a form of
technology that has the capacity to take into account neurological scanning as well as
variables that include context, memory, ego, etc. Basically, this requires technology that
has advanced to the point that it mirrors the human condition and the only way that can
happen is if humans have advanced enough that they obtained pure or absolute
knowledge about themselves. From a social constructivist point of view the viability of
this evolution is severely questioned, leaving us with the need to continue investigating
emotion from a rhetorical perspective. While only time will tell whether or not this will
be a fruitful scientific endeavor, Waddell and Fortenbaugh argue its existence does not
preclude an investigation of emotion through an analysis of rhetorical pathos.
Given

the

abundant

presence

of

rhetorical

scholars

arguing

for

a

reconceptualization of the way pathos operates in rhetoric it stands to question, why is
pathos’ denigration still so prominent in modern discourse? The answer lies in the
academy’s hardened esteem for scientific methods, in this case Aristotle’s system of
classification, and our tendency not to question the tenets of what Kuhn (3rd edition 1996)
calls ‘normal science’ and studies like cognitive psychology. Kuhn’s prolific work
challenges the prevailing notion that scientific knowledge is cumulative. Instead, he
suggests that it is episodic, in that major transitions in knowledge occur through the
recognition and dissonance created through anomalies. The transition is explained as
“…a reconstruction of the field from new fundamentals, a reconstruction that some of the
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field’s most elementary theoretical generalizations as well as many of its paradigm
methods and applications” (Kuhn, 1996, p. 85). Kuhn’s position essentially undermines
the truth-value of science by identifying “truth” as episodic instead of objective. He
reintroduced a humanistic perspective into science by arguing that the paradigm shifts of
science are not supported by pure logic and instead are supported by humanistic
motivations, thus making rhetoric relevant again.
Looking at the understanding of pathos in our modern academic and political
realms reveal numerous anomalies and perhaps may be signaling a coming revolution of
classification for decades. Kuhn suggests that when a scientist is faced with an,
“…admittedly fundamental anomaly in theory, the scientist’s first effort will often be to
isolate it more precisely and give it more structure” (p. 86). I argue that Aristotle’s vague
and often-conflicting account of pathos suggests that for him, pathos presented just that
sort of anomaly. Within the study of persuasion, pathos presented itself as a potentially
powerful force, but one that resisted integration into a classification system due to its
reliance on contextual factors like personal history, ego, and the nature of humanity.
Future symptoms of scientific expeditions wrestling with anomaly include “[they] often
seem a man searching at random, trying experiments just to see what will happen,
looking for an effect whose nature he cannot guess” (Kuhn, p. 87). This characterization
mirrors the common treatment of pathos as ethereal or intangible within the realm of
rhetoric. Aristotle acted just as Kuhn would eventually predict and scientist faced with an
anomaly would, he isolated pathos and attempted to force structure onto the term.
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However, Aristotle’s attempts were often contradictory and confusing leading scholars to
either dismiss the value of pathos and/or label it irrational and of a lesser status.
Given that the signs for a paradigm revolution are there, and scholars have been
questioning our popular conception of pathos for decades, the question arises: Why now?
First, our insistence on deifying the dominant interpretation of Aristotle and Aristotle’s
method of classification in rhetorical studies, an effort on his part to bridge the divide
between the dialectic and rhetoric, and ‘normal science’ in general, has been a
particularly tough paradigm to disrupt. This is not because of Aristotle’s work itself, but
instead because of the way in which our interpretation of it has become a canon in of
itself. The immense amount of scholarship that has been created on Aristotle’s work for
over 2000 years has accumulated and then formulated an immense boundary for scholars
to traverse in questioning either the scholar or our understanding of his work.
Second, the allure of normal science’s pursuit of certainty can be particularly
compelling in the complicated realm of the political. When it comes to power, either
economic or political, the stakes are high. The popularity of the aforementioned texts,
scientific accounts of emotion, affirms the desire of political actors and scholars to make
the ineffable of political life, i.e. pathetic discourse, definable and thus controllable. This
pursuit is not in of itself bad, but it becomes problematic when certainty over the future
of cognitive science leads us to ignore the productivity of rhetorical studies. Instead, it is
scientists’ hope and belief that they can succeed in efforts like cognitive psychology that
have led them to ignore the power of rhetorical studies to the detriment of a better
understanding of the power of pathetic reasoning.
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Finally, we can attribute the recognition of this paradigm shift to the rapid
changes in our technology over the past half a century. The Forum in Ancient Greece was
an insular activity. The citizens, white property owning males, offered a homogenous
cocoon within which to examine rhetorical action. Their rhetorical ruminations would not
be televised; they would not contest with an electorate that had the possibility to
democratize political actions through media such as social media. In Aristotle’s time,
political rhetoric was not a performance for the masses, it was an exercise reserved for
the very few to ponder and deliberate. However, in modern times, political rhetoric has
become highly democratized through social and technological changes like the Internet,
cable television, as well as advancements in civil rights and citizenship. This
phenomenon has led to a need to “go back to the drawing board” with respect to our
understanding of how political rhetoric operates.
The proliferation of competing articulations, the willingness to try anything, the
expression of explicit discontent, the recourse to philosophy and to debate over
fundamentals, all of these are symptoms of a transition from normal to
extraordinary research (Kuhn, 1996, p. 91).
According to Kuhn’s work, the ‘writing is on the wall’ for a coming pathetic ‘revolution.’
Further, “It is as elementary prototypes for these transitions of the scientist’s world that
the familiar demonstrations of a switch in visual gestalt prove so suggestive. What were
ducks in the scientist’s world before the revolution are rabbits afterwards” (Kuhn, p.
111). These shifts in scientific paradigms will not happen without the imprints of political
and cultural power throughout its trajectory. A critical rhetorical lens is essential so that
later sections of this work can explore the role of power by assessing who in society
benefits when we call it a duck and who benefits when we call it a rabbit.
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To begin this examination I now turn to the work of charting a rhetorical path
toward integrating pathos back into the graces of political discourse. To do this, I turn
back to the fundamentals of Aristotelian classification, eschewing a modern interpretation
of limitations placed on rhetorical devices and examine what Aristotle deemed, “the
substance of rhetorical persuasion,” the enthymeme (1354a, 15). At issue is that although
rhetoricians valued pathos, it was excluded from modes of reasoning as seen by the
classification of the enthymeme as purely logical. This idea should be abandoned in favor
of the utility of the pathetic enthymeme.
The Pathetic Enthymeme
In the previous section I argued in favor of an appreciation and better
understanding of the role pathos plays in our political sphere, in this section I articulate a
potentially productive method for accessing the power of pathos in rhetorical discourse.
The enthymeme, a rhetorical device first codified and described by Aristotle, however
ambiguously, is described as a “sort of syllogism,” and is more generally defined as an
argument where one premise is not explicitly stated (Aristotle, 1355a, 6). Among modern
rhetorical scholars, it has become common practice to situate the enthymeme in relation
to logos (Delia, 1970; Grimaldi, 1972; Holmberg, 1977; Dyck, 2002; Braet, 2005). This
became the modus operandi both because Aristotle placed the enthymeme within the
realm of the logical but also because the enthymeme is a deductive form of reasoning and
deduction is seen as rational in nature. This certitude persists despite the indeterminate
nature of Aristotle’s conception of the enthymeme and has become so prevalent within
rhetorical theory and pedagogy that it appears to have ascended to the point of
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canonization, right alongside the Aristotle. In order to better understand the possibilities
of the enthymeme, we must first examine literature that serves to free the enthymeme
from its logos-centric confines.
The understanding of Aristotle’s categorization of the enthymeme under the
auspice of logos, despite no explicit statement of this in Aristotle’s treatise, led to the
device being sundered from the power of pathos. To rectify this requires a rearticulation
of the syllogistic form that the enthymeme inhabits as always logos, and instead
recognizing the pathetic form of the syllogism. In this endeavor, following the work of
scholars like Fortenbaugh, Walker (1994) suggests that we look to the predecessors and
contemporaries of Aristotle to gain scholarly and historical contextualization. The pursuit
is particularly fruitful because based on our current logo-centric perspective; “We may be
confined to a narrow concept of argumentation, and of rhetoric generally, by tending to
subsume it under ‘logic’ of one kind or another, either syllogistic or Toulmainian” (1994,
p. 48).
The root of the ancient Greek word enthymema is thymos, which is loosely
translated into a definition that highlights emotions and desires related to a person’s sense
of justice and motive. “Thymos is, moreover, often linked to both the production and the
reception of passional thought and eloquent, persuasive discourse,” (Walker, 1994, p.
49). Walker takes this ideation further by arguing that there is a matter or intentionality
congruent with the passions felt from thymos, i.e. feeling and pain. He names this
strategic intention “kairotic inventiveness, “that is, an inventive responsive to what
ancient rhetoricians called kairos, ‘the opportune’ at any given moment in a particular
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rhetorical situation. Walker understands Isocrates’ and Anaximenes of Lampusacus’
articulations of enthymeme as operating similarly to the concept of “kairotic
inventiveness.”
“What Anaxamines’s Rhetoric of Alexander offers is the fullest surviving
presentation of a sophistic notion of enthymeme that is generally taken both to precede
and to follow Aristotle’s Rhetoric” (Walker, 1994, p. 49). In the Rhetoric of Alexander
the enthymeme is defined as an emphatic statement that operates like an
“argumentational cap” highlighting the contradictions at hand. “The audience is to feel
not simply that the speaker’s claims are true or probably, but that both speaker and claims
are good and admirable (Walker, p. 50).
Although, Anaximenes was comfortable with the enthymeme being reducible to a
form of techne, Isocrates was not. “Isocrates will not give us the satisfaction of a rigidly
precise or systematic account of the enthymeme,” because he is loathe to any reduction of
rhetoric to pure techne or “exact knowledge” (1994, p. 49). This intransigence was likely
ingrained by his sophistic education through teachers like the prolific Sophist and
Gorgias (Matsen, Rollinson, & Sousa, 1990). Instead, Isocrates believes that enthymemes
are at their best when they “seize the kairos of the moment to move the audience to a
decisive recognition that is or seems ‘lofty or original,’ while at the same time ‘cutting
off’ or shifting into the background other possible recognitions that may be latent in the
buildup” (Walker, 1994, p. 52). Isocrates’ conception draws in the notion of possible
‘change’ inherent to a broad view of pathos, while inferring the importance of the
audience’s participation within the kairotic moment.
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Waddell (1990) argues in a similar manner, “the interaction between logos and
pathos becomes clearer if we think of emotional appeals as enthymemes” (p. 390).
Following Waddell’s line of argumentation, it would appear that his suggestion would
reify pathos as a subject of logos due to its Aristotelian classification as a sort of
syllogism. However, Waddell draws from Bitzer’s (1959) reconsideration of the
enthymeme “which emphasizes the manner of construction of the enthymeme, rather than
content, form or relation…I think this view succeeds in focusing upon the unique
function of the enthymeme in rhetorical persuasion…its premises are always drawn from
the audience” (p. 408). Bitzer’s articulation removes the rhetorical theorist from the task
of classification of form and instead into the rhetorical function of the mechanics of
persuasion. Put more plainly, a successful enthymeme cannot be constructed by a speaker
in isolation fervently arranging a speech in the manner of a syllogism. Instead it is created
within the rhetorical moment, “and if the speaker or writer misjudges, and the audience
does not accept his or her premises or share the values inherent in them, the argument
will collapse” (Waddell, 1990, p. 391).
The suppressed member of the syllogism can be made known through what
Waddell describes as a post hoc “rational reconstruction,” which can also allow us to
recognize the “parallel, pathetic conclusion” (p. 391). Take for instance, the rhetorical
exigency in which President Obama argued for the passage of the Affordable Care Act in
2010:
Major premise: Everyone has basic human rights.
Minor premise: Healthcare is a human right.
Conclusion: Everyone should have access to healthcare.
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In this example the audience, leading to a pathetic conclusion, supplied the major
premise. From Waddell’s standpoint, there is a parallel pathetic conclusion, the value of
compassion being negotiated between the rhetor and the audience as seen through the
following pathetic enthymeme:
Major premise: Everyone has a right to compassion
Minor Premise: Universal healthcare is compassionate
Conclusion: Everyone has a right to universal healthcare
Waddell makes a strong case to reexamine the way in which the enthymeme is classified
as a sort of syllogism, in the terms of Aristotle. In addition, I suggest that a fruitful
pursuit is to go back to Aristotle’s original discussion of the enthymeme throughout the
entirety of The Rhetoric. Specifically, his classification of the difference between a
syllogism and what he articulates as an apparent syllogism.
With regard to the persuasion achieved by proof or apparent proof: just as in
dialectic there is induction on the one hand and syllogism or apparent syllogism
on the other, so it is in rhetoric. The example is an induction, the enthymeme is a
syllogism, and the apparent enthymeme is an apparent syllogism. I call the
enthymeme a rhetorical syllogism, and the example a rhetorical induction.
Everyone who effects persuasion through proof does in fact use either
enthymemes or examples: there is no other way. (Aristotle, 1356b 5)
Aristotle’s parsing of the enthymeme through the dissection of the term into a rhetorical
syllogism is instructive because it offers an entrance into the potential of the pathetic
enthymeme through his theoretical bridge. An extension of this idea underscores the
contemporary significance of this move as the rhetorical syllogism is presented as a
compromise with limitations and so mirrors the philosophical means that have
historically been utilized to constrain the rhetorical potential of women. Women’s voices
were relegated to the private sphere because they were accused of being imbued with
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pathos and so functionally irrational. Affording rationality to pathos can be extended to
obliterate this line of argument and afford greater access for women into public discourse.
In the following section I bring in the context of the rhetoric of the Office of the First
Lady as a symbolic site for the state of womanhood in order to further investigate the
pathetic potential of the enthymeme in action.
The Pathetic First Lady
In a similar manner to how traditional understandings of political decision-making
have worked to demarcate pathetic appeals from the realm of the rational, so too have
understandings of women’s relation to pathetic rhetoric worked to limit their access to the
rational realm of discourse. As previously argued in Chapter One, the marginalization of
women in the political sphere primarily operates through their restriction to the pathetic,
and thus private sphere. This argument gains further nuance through Fortenbaugh who
argues Aristotle attempted to avoid the charge of hypocrisy with respect to women and
pathos through his differentiation of slaves, children, and women. “Slaves are said to
possess the deliberative faculty not at all; women are said to possess it, but abkuron; and
children are said to possess it incompletely (1260a,12-14)” (p. 58). By stating that
women’s capability for deliberative faculty is abkuron, he means, “to say it lacks
authority and is easily overruled,” (Fortenbaugh, 1975, p. 60). Basically, Aristotle’s
circular logic with respect to women comes down to “a woman has reason, but it does not
prevail in the society of men” (p. 59). In other words, women may have the capacity for
reason and emotion, but emotion will obscure the rational capability of women. Aristotle
appears to give no other support except that it is in society’s interest.
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In modern politics in the United States this phenomenon is prominently
illuminated through the Office of the First Lady (OFL). I noted earlier in Chapter One,
Anderson (2005) argues that, “by virtue of their husbands’ elections, first ladies become
‘sites’ for the symbolic negotiation of female identity,” which ultimately works to both
“foster and constrain women’s agency” (p.2). These rhetorical limitations are readily seen
in the power dynamics between the Offices’ of the President and the First Lady. The OFL
offers a rhetorical space for a first lady to act, but one in which she is expected to limit
that performance to the parameters of ideal womanhood and femininity in the United
States.
Parry-Giles and Blair (2002) explained that the rise of the rhetorical first lady was
in part driven by the rise in the rhetorical presidency. They point out that it become more
common for first ladies to speak out on the public stage starting in the 1920’s, coinciding
with the rise of the first-wave of feminism and the movement for suffrage. Further, the
authors argue that you can chart the evolution of the role through the transition of first
ladies acting as “benevolent volunteer,” “republican mother,” to a modern day role in
which a first lady has the option to take on the role of a “national voice for civic
socialization” (pp. 574-577).
While many scholars (Campbell, 1998; Borelli, 2001; Parry-Giles & Blair, 2002;
Watson, 2003; Wertheimer, 2004; Anderson, 2004; Schwalbe, 2005; Spillars, 2009;
Anderson, 2011, Borrelli, 2011; Natalle & Simon, 2015) in the last thirty years have
come to accept the importance of studying the Office of the First Lady, two prominent
controversies persist. The first is the issue of OFL’s legitimacy to the presidency and the
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potential power that position offers. Second, a first lady will consistently find herself
under panoptic surveillance related to the appropriateness of her display.
In the case of legitimacy, this controversy primarily centers on the perception that
the first lady’s relationship to power is sexual in nature due to her marriage to the
President originally presented in Chapter One. This situation spurs patriarchy’s fears of
female sexuality and presents a symbol on which this fear is given room to coalesce, the
first lady. This fear is magnified because the OFL is not an elected position and so her
proximity to the president provokes fear of her influence.
Scholars like Vasby Anderson (2005) argue that the OFL maintains her power
through the potential for civic representation. She supports this argument by pointing to
past first ladies that “have been able to confound the ambiguities latent in gender
dichotomies by developing paradox in ways that deconstruct female identity and open
possibilities for political agency” (Anderson, 2005, p. 2). Essentially, a first lady
maintains agency through the degree that she mirrors or challenges prevailing notions of
femininity. This creates a paradox that the audience is left to resolve. The legitimacy
question can then be resolved if the audience comes to view her as a legitimate
representation of themselves.
Another prominent controversy concerns the ‘appropriate’ position of a first lady
with respect to the presidential administration, namely, should we consider the
presidency a two-person career? The answer to this question has governmental and
rhetorical implications. From a governmental perspective, if the OFL is legitimated as the
‘partner of the president,’ our very understanding of the distribution of power in the
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government will come into question. Rhetorically, presenting the first lady as a ‘partner’
to the president challenges the gender dynamics being represented by the president and
first lady. Essentially, if the first lady is equal to the president with respect to power and
on such a prominent stage, then why aren’t all American women afforded the same
position? Watson (1997) argues in favor because “Not only is her office budget and staff
larger than many of the so-called ‘key’ advisors and institutions that presidential scholars
study, but as presidential spouse she assumes a role perhaps more central to the
president’s career and White House success than any formal advisor.” However, Troy
(2000) is a prominent critic of this approach:
Most Americans do not want the first couple sharing power in the White House.
Moreover, the manner in which the job of first lady has evolved over the past few
decades actually hinders a first lady’s effectiveness in the policy-making role.
Presidential couples are supposed to work together on joint image-making, not
power-sharing. Presidents have learned that a popular first lady can provide cheap
and easy political points and are an essential prop in defining the presidential
image. Regardless of her prospective positives, a controversial first lady can do a
great deal more in lasting damage.
Troy’s move to limit the first lady from power to a function of “image-making” assumes
that image-making is meaningless. My argument is that “image-making” is still a position
of power in the form of the pathetic. Image-making derives its power from the pathetic
enthymeme. It is the construction of the image that the first lady is involved in creating
that has the potential to act as a suppressed member of rationalized and pathetic
syllogism. Finnegan illuminates this process by arguing, “the power of the enthymeme
lies in the fiction that its unstated premise, at once invisible and transparent, is ‘natural’
rather than context-bound; it is something that ‘everybody knows’” (2005, p. 34). The
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rhetorical power of the OFL operates in a similar manner to Finnegan’s articulation of the
enthymeme.
The OFL’s visuality, caught in the paradox of living a private life on a public
stage, has the potential to operate as an unstated premise, because of the ‘natural,’ or
ordinary being performed on an extraordinary stage. Whether it is her celebrating a
holiday as the host of the White House Easter Egg Hunt, lighting the Christmas tree, or
decorating the White House, the first lady performs these duties, common in American
households on a national stage. Her performance becomes symbolic as a representation of
the American people.
Further, the performance can be unstated in that her ‘goodness’ i.e. adherence to
dominant conceptions of womanhood, may lend credence to the masculinity of the
president. It could also serve to challenge the prevailing dichotomy between the
masculinity and femininity as some first ladies have done. For example, in the 1992
presidential election Hillary Clinton infamously quipped “I guess I could have stayed
home and baked cookies and had teas, but what I decided to do was fulfill my profession
which I entered before my husband was in public life” (Walter, 2012). The fact that so
many in the media and beyond were so critical of that comment from Hillary Clinton
reveals the importance of the first lady managing the double-bind on a national stage for
her potential success.
All of this is not to say that the Office of the First Lady lacks agency for making
change between the masculine-feminine dynamics in the White House and beyond. There
is much rhetorical power at stake when a first lady disrupts the ‘unstated premise’ and
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forces us to engage with the validity of that premise. Basically, the first lady walks on a
continual tightrope in which she must adhere to standard practices of femininity to
remain relevant, while also maintaining the potential power to disrupt that narrative.
Essential to this tightrope walk is that the performance of a first lady has the power to
engage the audience in the rhetorical act of a pathetic enthymeme and with it the
possibility of redefinition of social norms in the process. It is the very visuality, both the
ordinary and extraordinary nature, of her role that invokes constituents’ doxa and with it
their pathetic cognition in an enthymematic manner.
It is through her employment of social political style that her enthymematic
potential becomes salient. The rhetorical strength of her style lies in her potential to
involve the audience in the articulation of the pathetic enthymeme. This is distinct from
the primary rhetorical force of the president’s primarily logos-centric argumentation
style, because her use of the pathetic enthymeme allows her to access the negotiation of
the values that undergird the logos-centric argument. This is not to suggest a hierarchy in
that pathos will be subsumed by logos, but instead to place pathetic argumentation on an
equal plane with logos-centric argument. Vasby Anderson suggests a potential for
liberation through the social political style, “Consequently, a third component of the
social style is that it enacts political power while disguising its nature as political. In this
way, the social style invokes the realist style’s artistry disguised by professional
artlessness,” (p. 9).
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CHAPTER 3 THE FIRST LADY IN THE COURT OF PATHETIC POLITICS
The past two chapters work to support the overarching idea that the denigration of
the pathetic realm was purposeful and a tool for ruling classes to maintain their status of
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the people. In this chapter I explore the historical precedents of this form of power by
investigating the pathetic realm as understood through the concept of courtly politics.
The Office of the First Lady is imbued in contradiction derived from the
intersection of the public and the private realms of corporeal rhetoric. Vasby Anderson
(2005) explains that many first ladies have developed acumen for what she conceives of
as a “social style” that gives a first lady access to political agency without violating
norms of femininity. This social political style is drawn from Hariman’s (1995) theory of
political style defined as “a coherent repertoire of rhetorical conventions depending on
aesthetic reactions for political effect…and identifies four styles prominent in maledominated political spheres: realist, republican, courtly, and bureaucratic” (p. 13).
Most impactful for understanding the first lady as enthymeme is that Anderson
conceives of the social style of the first lady as being a combination of Hariman’s
conception of republican style that “privileges rhetoric, operates from consensus, and
draws power from heroic mythos,” (pp. 95-140) and courtly style wherein “roles of
decorum are sovereign attention is focused on the body, and speech is suppressed” (pp.
51-94). Vasby Anderson describes the social style as a combination of, “From the courtly
style it draws a focus on decorum, minimization of speech, and attention to the
body…From the republican style the social style garners an emphasis on consensus,
efforts to foster a constituent base, and the standard of civic virtue” (2005, p. 9). It is the
combination from this interaction of these two political styles wherein the audience is
provoked into enthymematic action. In this social style, the first lady is drawn to the
visual, because her speech is often suppressed. However, the republican elements of style
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offer her a significant role in representation due to her charge of fostering a constituent
base and acting as a standard and site of negotiation for American civic virtue.
In Robert Hariman’s 1995 work, Political Style: The Artistry of Power, he
argues, “the human sciences have had difficulty comprehending the aesthetic dimensions
of political experience,” (p. Back Matter). My project suggests that this difficulty is
largely due to academic’s insistence on omitting or overlooking the influence of the
pathetic in the political realm. In this chapter I examine the pathetic by looking at the
body as a site wherein pathos coalesces through the impact of visuality and proximity.
Overlooking the influence of pathos, rhetoricians generally fail to account for the role of
the body in areas such as the rhetorical presidency. Stuckey 2010 explains, “Certainly, it
is true that power plays out through people’s bodies, [but] there is very little work
grounded in the rhetorical presidency that brings bodies to the forefront,” (2010, p. 44).
In this chapter, I attempt to answer that summons by examining the way in which First
Lady Michelle Obama’s rhetoric accesses the pathetic through the body, and how that
accomplishment can be explained through the lens of Hariman’s theory of courtly
politics.
Hariman argues that ignoring the aesthetic in political experience is limiting to
scholars and politicians alike in that it averts our eyes from the way in which pathos, as
practiced through a ‘courtly style’ connected to the body, is a constant force within
modern day democracies. In this process pathos is tied to the courtly style and by
extension to social style:
A discourse can persist after its ‘original’ social structure collapses, and the
rhetorical critic has to consider how that discourse can continue to influence
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people. Too often, the effect of both historical analysis of Western courts and
anthropological study of traditional societies is to lock courtliness into a foreign
institution and a distant time and place. (Hariman, Political Style: The Artistry of
Power, 1995)
Although the original social structure, the courts of monarchial rule, has fallen out of
favor the, vestiges of courtly politics remain. In courtly politics power was derived from a
political actor’s proximate position to the body of the sovereign. The details of this shift
will be further examined throughout the work in this chapter. I argue that the body’s
rhetorical power is one such vestige that has persevered through the rise of democracy by
shifting its locus from being derived from ‘around’ the body to being ‘in’ the body. In
other words, in modern political structures it is ‘in’ the body or the corporeal that courtly
politics thrive.
Charting the shift of this rhetorical power is done through an examination of
Michel Foucault’s concept of biopower within the framework of Hariman’s articulation
of courtly style and the repercussions of that shift on modern political actors. Foucault
argues that post the fall of monarchies as a dominant form of governance, modern
governments have turned from an era of regulating the body through death to an era,
“characterized [by] a power whose highest function was perhaps no longer to kill, but to
invest life through and through,” (1990, p. 139). Essentially, governance turned toward
the work of regulating the “conduct of conduct,” of bodies (Crossley, 1996, p. 105). For
Foucault this era is further characterized by “an explosion of numerous and diverse
techniques for achieving the subjugation of bodies and control of populations, marking
the beginning of an era of ‘bio-power,’” (1990, p. 140). In modern society there are
numerous examples of the government attempting to exert control over the “conduct of
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conduct” of bodies. Some recent examples include government sponsored healthcare
programs such as Michelle Obama’s anti-obesity campaign, proposed taxes on foods
deemed unhealthy, as well as debates surrounding the availability of reproductive
healthcare for women.
It is in the reconciliation of courtly style and biopower that the need to identify a
political expression of pathetic politics can be examined. Hariman’s concept of the power
inherent to courtly style relies on the governing structure of a monarchy. However,
Hariman’s work leaves off at monarchy and on its own does not explain what happens to
the power of courtly politics when monarchies fall to new systems of democratic rule. I
draw from the rhetoric of First Lady Michelle Obama for this analysis primarily because
of the source of her particular position within the administration. The woman that
inhabits the Office of the First Lady gains that position and the rhetorical potential that
goes with it, wholly because of her proximity to the president and in the same manner
described in courtly politics. As I have noted in previous chapters, she is not elected and
she has no prescribed duties by any government document including the Constitution.
However, in the modern democratic structure of the government of the United States she
is the number one purveyor of courtly style in the country. She exists in the peculiar
position Kathleen Jamieson Hall calls the ‘double bind,’ meaning that she is called on to
act privately publicly (Jamieson, 1995). For female politicians this bind means that they
are required to act masculine to gain power, but that requirement undermines their
femininity. For the first lady the conundrum is different in that she is allowed to act
feminine, really expected to, but that expression of femininity precludes her from acting
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as a politician within the logos-centric world of presidential politics. However, given
recent technological advancements that rely on visuality, like cable news and the Internet,
the pathetic power becomes more closely associated with the visual and the body as
biopower becomes more accepted. The significant potential of this body rhetoric is that it
might allow her to move out of a place where her power is solely based on the president,
and instead may be expressed as her own.
Political Power in the Court and Beyond
Hariman explains the utilization of courtly style in a historical framework as he
begins in times of monarchial rule. In this time courtly style is formulated as a mode of
protection against the precariousness of court life, for both the sovereign and the people.
An effective measure for protecting the body of a sovereign was to dismember it, in order
to allow loyalists to provide additional guardianship. “Courtly politics differs from other
political cultures by its emphasis on the body of the monarch, and in this symbolic system
the king usually benefits from further division of his body into parts mortal and mystic,”
(Hariman, Political Style: The Artistry of Power, 1995). This process of protection is
notably explained through the doctrine of the ‘King’s Two Bodies,’ a passage said to
have been offered by lawyers of Elizabeth I:
The King has in him two Bodies, viz., a Body natural, and a Body politic. His
body Natural (if it be considered in itself) is a Body mortal, subject to all
Infirmities that come by nature or accident, to the Imbecility of Infancy or old
Age…but his Body politic is a body that cannot be seen or handled, consisting of
Policy and Government. (Hariman, Political Style: The Artistry of Power, 1995,
p. 58)
The people navigated the constant jeopardy of courtly life by adhering to certain
standards communicated by the sovereign and performed by surrounding courtiers.
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Knowledge of the framework of decorum was essential for courtiers as they spent their
days operating in the presence of an entity that could have their life taken for any reason
a sovereign deems necessary. “Rather than merely ornamenting power, at court the rules
of decorum serve as the primary means for accomplishing the essential task of any
political system: regulating subordinate behavior without force,” (p. 55). Courtiers were
compelled to conduct their bodies in decorous ways amenable to the king because of the
constant pressure of their visual presence in front of the sovereign. “The courtiers
exemplified both the general rule that bodily control is an expression of social control,
and a specific form of social control that makes the decorous body the sign of order, and
speech the sign of disorder,” (p. 62).
Hariman allows Michel Foucault to summarize the issue, “In a society like that of
the seventeenth century, the King’s body wasn’t a metaphor, but a political reality. Its
physical presence was necessary for the functioning of the monarchy,” (p. 59).
Essentially, “power was measured [in courtly life] by proximity to the body of the king,”
(Hariman, Political Style: The Artistry of Power, 1995, p. 59). Finally, Hariman draws
from Foucault to explain how exertion of decorum further exceeds ornamentation as, “the
embodiment of power beginning with the monarch generates the micropolitics of the
social system,” (p. 60).
Hariman and Foucault’s articulations of the expression of political power intersect
in the decorous body in court, but Foucault’s philosophical objective diverges in trying to
understand how power is exerted post-monarchy. The central thesis to Foucault’s theory
is encapsulated in a term he coined “biopower,” literally meaning “power over bodies,”
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However, it is best explained as the combination of power and life, which leaves open the
preposition that has traditionally linked them, “of/over/through/by.” Contrary to the time
of the monarchy wherein the body of the sovereign and people were held to standards of
decorum, Foucault argues that post-monarchy that power, “never operated in the same
manner as the King’s body under the monarchy. On the contrary, it’s the body of society
which becomes the new principle in the nineteenth century,” (1980, p. 55). As the power
shifts from the body of the sovereign into the bodies of the general public, it does so
through the controlling mechanism of surveillance of the general public.

Foucault

utilizes the concept of the Panopticon to explain this form of surveillance, “Hence the
major effect of the Panopticon:

to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and

permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power, (1995, p. 201).
Unique to the Panopticon is the potential that anyone can use it, “The Panopticon is a
marvelous machine which, whatever use one may wish to put it to, produces homogenous
effects of power,” (1995, p. 202).
The justification for this exercise of power is that post-monarchy, the social body
needs protection from itself, “In place of the rituals that served to restore the corporeal
integrity of the monarch, remedies and therapeutic devices are employed such as the
segregation of the sick, the monitoring of contagions, the exclusion of delinquents,”
(1980, p. 55). Foucault’s conception of bio-power as a social and political force has been
rightly celebrated for its explanatory power in post monarchial societies. However,
Foucault does not discuss what happens to courtly style as monarchial power fades. It is
in this space that I argue the place of courtly style in a biopower regime exists in appeals
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to the body. The OFL is a productive place to see this phenomenon, as the Office of the
President resembles the king in a monarchy, so the power of the OFL is that of the court.
But in a post monarchial world the OFL accesses biopower, taking the body and imbuing
it with life. This process is done through the visual body, which operates rhetorically as
pathetic argument.
Drawing from selected interviews and other writings compiled and published in
1980 as Power/Knowledge, states that sources of power never fully dissolve

“the

impression that power weakens and vacillates here is in fact mistaken; power can retreat
here, re-organize its forces, invest itself elsewhere…and so the battle continues,” (p. 56).
I argue that the ‘here’ where this proximal, power via proximity to the monarch, power
re-organizes is within the dimensions of recent advancements of the mass media.
Essentially, Hariman and Foucault come into productive conversation when we accept
the premise that the rhetorical power of ‘around’ the body from courtly style and the
rhetorical power placed ‘in’ the body as articulated through biopower may exist
simultaneously in our modern political environments. Further, there is a potential for a tie
to ethos as drawn from the combination of pathos and logos, but it is pathos that is the
driving force.. In the next section I examine these claims by looking to the details of a
first lady situated in courtly style political life. I primarily focus on the first lady’s
rhetorical use of the transformation of rhetorical power, derived from being ‘around’ the
body of the president, into an expression of her own power structured by the biopolitics
of her initiatives.
The First Lady In and Out of Court
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In our republican democracy a first lady stands as the number one purveyor of
courtly politics through her visibility and access to the president. As Hariman explains,
“TV stories must have pictures, and accounts of presidential action usually are presented
through pictures of the president, so that increasingly the disposition of the president’s
body comes to stand for executive action,” (p. 92). This observation illuminates the
modern day need for dismemberment and partitioning of the presidential body. Basically,
our ability to survey has outmatched an individual president’s ability to provide imagery
for that surveillance. Given the continual complexity of the role of the president, the need
for a surrogate to fill the visual void left by his absence is exacerbated. The Office of the
First Lady stands as a prominent means to fill that visual void.
As the First Lady embarks on embodying the role of courtier, her capacity for
visuality related to her physical body becomes paramount, “When power is concentrated
in the body, then it must be distributed through the body,” (p. 65). The rhetorical
importance of this distribution of courtly style has three primary contentions: that it still
exists, it is a means to organize the meaning of political experience, and “to the extent
that it operates as a pattern of identification within the mass media, the style coalesces
around the metonymic representations of beautiful or powerful bodies,” (Hariman,
Political Style: The Artistry of Power, p. 78).
For Hariman, this is all, “an example of postmodern culture in action: The
premodern practice re-emerges in modern life through propagation by the mass media,
but in fragmented form that characterizes no specific social structure yet becomes a
dimension of media production itself,” (p. 53). In modern day political life in the United
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States Hariman located these fragmented forms outside of realist political theories of
government. He argues that courtly style entails a generative principle of hierarchy that is
most active in the following discursive locales:
Three sites of courtliness seem prominent: celebrity culture, particularly in the
entertainment industry but also including figures from government and business
[for reasons that should not be mysterious]; advertising, particularly as it involves
images of the female body; and the American presidency. (pp. 79-80)
Courtly style is particularly adept in offering an entrance into how a first lady is
able to draw from rhetoric related to her own body and the body of her husband. In terms
of courtly style, this rhetoric has the potential to capture the collective imagination of the
citizenry. Hariman explains, a fixation on the body in the political realm “confers great
appeal and authority on the actor while it provides the audience with a vocabulary for
understanding the micropolitics of gestural empowerment,” (p. 83). Notably, he states
that there is an ancillary advantage for the executive in conferring body rhetoric to a
surrogate in that, “courtly roles and responses that would be considered dangerous or
embarrassing in deliberations of policy provide effective means for controlling a realm of
collective imagination, (p. 87). This gives further credence to the utility of accessing
power as it is disseminated through proximity to the body of the president.
While first ladies have regularly been known to draw celebrities to the vicinity of
the president through official state functions, Michelle Obama’s affiliation with celebrity
culture is unique in form and function in her utilization of body rhetoric to enhance her
personal ethos.
There is no shortage of examples of Michelle Obama drawing on celebrity culture
in pursuit of her initiatives. For the purpose of this analysis I draw from two primary
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political spectacles that drew both celebration and condemnation from the public. The
first of these is Michelle Obama’s connection to famed singer Beyoncé Knowles
The Obama’s admiration for Beyoncé as a performer first became apparent when
she was tapped to sing at the Inaugural Ball for President Obama in 2009. Since then,
Beyoncé has made regular appearances in support of Michelle Obama’s first lady
initiatives as well as singing the national anthem at Obama’s second inauguration in
2012. Analysis of two prominent visual performances of the women reveal an aesthetic
that has the potential to merge the ethos of one with the other.
In 2011 Beyoncé released a music video for the song ‘Move Your Body,’ in
support of Michelle Obama’s ‘Let’s Move!’ anti-obesity campaign. The video was
released through the Let’s Move campaign as part of a coordinated effort with middle
schools to promote fitness ‘flash dances’ all over the country. The video largely serves an
instructional function as the viewer is asked to learn the moves that the dancers, led by
Beyoncé, are performing. As the school children come into formation behind Beyoncé
their bodies are on display dancing in obedience to the lyrics of the song:
I ain’t worried doing me tonight, A little sweat ain’t never hurt nobody, Don’t just
stand there on the wall, Everybody just move your body, (jump, jump, jump,
jump, jump, jump, jump, jump, jump) (Beyonce Knowles Lyrics, 2016)
The lyrics culminate in the chanting of “Wave the American Flag!” while the
dancers continue to move their bodies back and forth (Beyonce Knowles Lyrics, 2016).
The comingling of Beyoncé’s visual presence and rhetoric commonly utilized in Michelle
Obama’s anti-obesity campaign presents a slippage in which the First Lady may draw
from Beyoncé’s ethos.
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This would not be the last time that the rhetoric of the two women would be
joined to achieve a level of conjoined ethos. In 2016 Michelle Obama appeared on a
segment of talk show host James Corden’s “Carpool Karaoke,” in which she sang along
with Corden to one of Beyoncé’s most famous songs, “Single Ladies.” The politics of
this moment did not go unnoticed by the media but was nevertheless hailed as
propaganda done right:
It’s one little anecdote that does so much: remind us of…their relatability as
parents, as teenagers, as people who love belting Beyoncé on their commute. The
exchange also provides a near metaphor for what Michelle Obama has done with
this instantly viral Late Late Show segment. She’s technically in the passenger
seat, but really, she’s driving the car, (Kornhaber, 2016).
Although this segment operates inversely to the music video as viewers encounter the
visual of Michelle Obama, singing and dancing to the words of Beyoncé, the result is a
similar sort of shared ethos.
In 2012 Michelle Obama put her physical display and competitiveness on display
by engaging in a series of push-up challenges with celebrities. In the first even the First
Lady accepted the challenge from daytime talk show host Ellen DeGeneres to a push-up
competition on her television talk show The Ellen DeGeneres Show. Michelle handily
won the competition completing 25 push-ups to best DeGeneres. This display of her
physicality was framed by many in the media as an example of her embodying her
initiatives. “The First Lady Michelle Obama isn’t blowing hot air when she stumps on the
importance of physical fitness. She proved Wednesday that she’s got the moves to back it
up,” (Dwyer, 2012).
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However, not everyone was pleased with her performance. The media outlet The
Huffington Post reported that for some voters, her actions violated a level of decorum
they expect from a first lady. The interviewee explained, “I don’t like his wife. She’s far
from the first lady. It’s about time we get a first lady in there that acts like a first lady,
and looks like a first lady…I mean, can you imagine you know, Kennedy’s or the Bushes
or anybody doing push-ups on the floor? I mean you know. That’s just not a first lady,”
(Michelle Obama 'Doesn't Look or Act' Like a First Lady, says Virgina Voter Bobbie
Lussier, 2012). In this statement are two primary arguments that both revolve around
audience expectations of decorum. First, that she doesn’t look like a first lady, the
interviewee goes so far as to state that she ‘She’s far from the first lady,’ questioning
drawing on Michelle’s visuality as negating her role as first lady. Second, the statement
infers that Michelle abiding to an appropriate level of decorum seen in previous images
of members of presidential administrations. When prompted by the interviewer as to
whether her statement has racial undertones, the interviewee responded, “It’s [an issue of]
respect…for being in the White House,” (Michelle Obama 'Doesn't Look or Act' Like a
First Lady, says Virgina Voter Bobbie Lussier, 2012).
Hariman explains, “At court, any interruption of critique of pomp can be
subversive, for the rules of decorum are sovereign, and the courtier’s success or failure
depends on continually discerning the shifting applications of the social code governing
all conduct,” (1995, p. 54). It is in this supposed subversion of decorum that the First
Lady’s proximal power to the president has great utility in justifying her own expression
of power. For other courtiers not legally wed to the president, their proximity to the body
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of the president is subject to continual evaluation. Given the constant prominence of
images of the President and the First Lady both before and after these events lends
credence to her performance as not a violation of decorum but the emergence of a new
decorum.
With respect to the manner through which power is disseminated through the
body of the sovereign and surrounding courtiers, of this process Hariman explains:
Thus, a second displacement occurs, which is perfectly suited to the purpose of
the persuasive practice: the courtesan’s body becomes a substitute for the king
within the realm of representation, the new receptacle for the power flowing
through the social order, nor entirely an order of desire and consumption. That is,
within the realm of advertising, the image of a woman’s body becomes the
symbolic form for concentration and distrusting a great flow of social energy. (p.
89)
Of the many venues offered to a first lady for representation, appearances on magazine
covers, and within them in full-page spreads, is one of the most common. In terms of
breadth and frequency, Michelle Obama’s tenure as first lady stands out for her success
gracing the covers of magazines. Since 2014:
Obama’s list of magazine covers in the past five years includes Vogue (twice),
People, Reader’s Digest, Parade, Parents, Good Housekeeping, AARP, Condé
Nast Traveler, More, Glamour, Ladies’ Home Journal, Prevention, Ebony and
Better Homes and Gardens. The list is nearly endless. She’s even been illustrated
on the cover of The New Yorker, (Newman, 2014).
Although Michelle eventually gained success on the covers of magazines she had
a notably rocky start with this medium during the 2008 election cycle. In July of 2008
The New Yorker magazine ran an image on their cover depicting the First Lady dressed in
all black, sporting an afro hairstyle, and a Kalashnikov rifle over her shoulder giving a
fist bump to her husband, dressed as Osama Bin Laden, in the Oval Office of the White
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House. Hariman explains that in courtly politics gestural images are important, “As an
individual becomes individuated through a gesture-cocking an eyebrow, pointing a
figure, licking the upper lip—the body part becomes a form of focal knowledge,” (p. 81).
For Michelle, the gesture of the fist bump would become connected to her, providing
some with the ‘knowledge’ that she is radical in her politics. However, subsequent
appearances across a range of periodicals worked to counter this particular type of social
knowledge.
While the editor of the magazine defended the cover explaining that it is a parody
of extremist fears about the couple, the magazine cover became a rallying point for
Obama’s detractors as it offered a space for their fears to coalesce. A primary contention
undergirding this fear is that Michelle is the more dominant member in her marriage.
Michelle is depicted dressed in all black and in a style that is commonly attributed to the
Black Power movement. The anger culturally over-associated with that movement is
placed on Michelle and fuels a perception of her as the stereotypical ‘angry black
woman.’ Hariman argues that initial fear to female power is common in the courtly style:
Woman’s power is first dispersed and has to be reconcentrated; man’s power
begins concentrated and may be dispersed. Furthermore, as fragmented bodies
become more common, the whole body becomes threatening, a potentially
dangerous concentration of power.” (p. 91)
This consideration of gender, body, and power is important because it speaks to the
common tactic of attacking women who seek power by attacking their body as unfit to
manage that power. Whether it is a pundit’s comment that a woman is too emotional due
to her hormones, too distracting because of her looks, or too unhealthy because of her
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age, attacking a woman for the state of her body is a common refrain in the political
realm.
A 2015 examination by Time magazine on the evolution of Michelle Obama’s
magazine covers is a prime artifact to chart the way her political persona has responded
to early criticisms. The Time’s piece highlights 15 magazine covers starting in 2008 with
a central introductory theme. A 2008 cover of Radar magazine challenges their readers
with an unsmiling image of Michelle from the shoulders up with the headline, “What’s so
scary about Michelle Obama?” Ebony and Newsweek magazine followed with covers
showing a smiling Michelle Obama with headlines claiming to reveal the “real Michelle
Obama” (See the Evolution of Michelle Obama in Magazine Covers, 2015).
After Obama’s successful election in November of 2008, the covers featuring
Michelle Obama start to take a different tone. In 2009 Vogue featured a cover of Michelle
with the headline, “Michelle Obama, The first lady that the world’s been waiting for.”
What is notable about the accompanying image is that it depicts Michelle in a low power
nonverbal stance. Michelle is depicted lounging on a chair in the White House with a soft
smile and a hand holding her neck. In nonverbal terms, the position of holding your neck
is largely considered a very low power stance. Overall, the cover can be read as an
attempt to visually connect Michelle with the image of a first lady as unassuming, soft,
and feminine. It is around the time of the Vogue magazine cover in 2009 that New York
Magazine releases an edition with a smiling face of Michelle looking off into the distance
and a headline stating, “The Power of Michelle Obama, From terrorist fist bumper to
American icon in eight months flat.” The first lady-style feminization of Michelle Obama

	
  

79

is complete. In terms of courtly style Michelle Obama’s power had been contested and
dispersed primarily through visuals related to her body only to be reconstituted into an
unthreatening and traditional frame of what a first lady should be.
In 2010, with her cultural ethos and resulting poll numbers at a high, a thematic
shift begins when Michelle announced her anti-obesity campaign. A 2010 cover of
Newsweek magazine featured Michelle in pearls sitting behind what appears to be a desk
and an apple in front of her; overall she offers the impression that she is a teacher with a
headline that reads, “Feed your children well.” In each subsequent year, a magazine cover
is represented that connects emerging initiatives from her office. In 2012, boosting the
confidence of your girls is referenced, in 2013, her role as Mom-in-Chief continues with
a headline in Essence magazine, “Michelle Obama, Her secret to raising smart kids.” In
2014, Michelle’s image is on the cover of Redbook magazine with a headline framing her
request to “Help our female veterans.” Finally, in 2015 Michelle is on the cover of
Cooking Light magazine eating some presumably healthy dish with the text surrounding
her stating, “Michelle Obama celebrates the fifth anniversary of Let’s Move!”
Taken together, the headlines referenced above depict the various sites from
which Michelle Obama managed to derive power. The first two years of Michelle’s time
in the spotlight focus on shaping her position relative to the president. Common thematic
elements include defending and constructing her public image as non-threatening and in
line with traditional expectations of first ladies. However, the trajectory shifts into a
reconcentration of her power in 2010 with the announcement of her first initiative and
thus the beginning of her expression of power derived from her own body. Magazine
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covers gradually started portraying her in bolder colors, with a confident smile, and
eventually framing not only her face but also her entire body as a source for possible
appreciation by the American people. In Hariman’s terms, the changing styles of these
covers coincide with the mass media in the “metonymic representations of beautiful or
powerful bodies,” (p. 78). Depiction of her body, particularly depictions of her body
displaying physical strength appear to have had the potential to replace the fist bump as a
component of gestural knowledge surrounding the first lady. Essentially, her strength
became a visual representation of her source of political power, her body.
To some extent each first lady is free to construct her position as related to her
own goals, the goals of her spouse, and attributes of her personality. Within this
individuality rhetorical scholars have managed to identify a few discursive trends
available to first ladies that include acting as ‘national mother,’ ‘benevolent volunteer,’
etc. (Parry-Giles & Blair, The Rise of the Rhetorical First Lady: Politics, Gender
Ideology, and Women's Voice, 1789-2002, 2002). Further, examination of a first lady’s
rhetorical potential as connected to the rhetoric of the president is consistently a lucrative
site for analysis. Hariman explains, “The courtly style provides a mode of political
expression that communicates the experience of power, and it equips a group to locate,
track, and contain specific forms of persuasive skills and to identify the role of customs,
status, emotions, and taste in executive decision-making,” (Hariman, Political Style: The
Artistry of Power, 1995, p. 94). Further, as the third of the discursive realms that Hariman
cites as productive sites for courtly style, the American Presidency is the most direct. A
prominent interview that the First Lady and President Obama emphasizes the way the
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President positions the First Lady in relation to public policy, which moves pathetic
politics into the public space traditionally reserved for logos centered deliberation.
In the beginning of his second term as president, the President and Michelle
Obama sat down for an interview with Vogue Magazine. From the start of the article
Michelle is rhetorical positioned on an even plane with the President as the first line
explains that the couple will speak about, “their life as parents, their marriage, and their
vision for America’s families,” (Van Meter, 2014). As the first couple enters the room
for the interview the photographer is quoted as pointing out, “there’s a lot of hugging
going on [between the first couple]…You’re a very different kind of president and First
Lady,” (Van Meter, 2014). The magazine would mimic their display of physical
closeness in the images accompanying the article. In the primary image the President is
sitting in a chair and Michelle stands behind him embracing him in a hug from behind the
chair.
From Hariman’s perspective, this visual intimacy may be setting the stage for
expression of the Obamas’ political philosophy, “at some point a political style can be
understood as the artistic expression of a political theory,” (p. 71). President Obama’s
political philosophy is portrayed by detailing his governing style in a manner that
positions Michelle as a partner in that endeavor:
Well, I’ll tell you, says President Obama, his wife looking at him with a beatific
smile as our interview winds down, ‘everything we have done has been viewed
through the lens of family. And I mean family broadly conceived…Beyond just
the immediate family to the larger American family, and making sure everybody’s
included and making sure that everybody’s got a seat at the table. (Van Meter,
2014)
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While it is a popular trope in presidential rhetoric to speak in communal sentiments, what
is rhetorically significant is when the President goes on to apply this governing metaphor
of family to specific accounts of public policy:
The work I did in the first couple of years to make sure we didn’t go into a Great
Depression—that was family policy…making sure people have jobs, making sure
the economy is working, making sure that people’s savings aren’t dissipating—
those have all been family policy as well. (Van Meter, 2014)
Taking into account President Obama Michelle Obama’s assertion that she will be
‘Mom-in-Chief’ upon her ascendency to the position of First Lady, and coupling it with
President Obama’s framing of his public policy through the lens of family, rhetorically
stations the First Lady with a more substantial relationship to public policy than
previously assumed. This is not to suggest she has an objectively equal influence on
policy, but it is to suggest that President Obama sees her role as having some use related
to his own policy. Hariman offers an explanation for the rhetorical utility of the first lady,
“courtly roles and responses that would be considered dangerous or embarrassing in
deliberations of policy provide effective means for controlling a realm of collective
imagination,” (p. 87). Applying Hariman’s prescription to Obama’s political philosophy
could suggest that the role of first lady, a position that has a great access to pathetic
politics via the courtly style, is another plane of deliberation that the first lady is
particularly adept at engaging.
Conclusion
The analysis in this chapter supports the primary thesis that the proximal power
derived from ‘around’ the body of the sovereign does not disappear in the transition from
monarchial rule to the biopower of the populace. Instead it becomes part of a transition of
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power ‘around’ the body to power ‘in’ the body. In terms of biopower this happens
through a method of surveillance that is available to all equally within a republican style
democracy. In terms of the Office of the First Lady this transition can be see through her
leveraging her proximal power to the body of the president in a manner that builds
pathetic rhetorical power in her own body. Further, it reveals how the Office of the First
Lady is uniquely situated to access this pathetic realm of politics. However, as Hariman
warns, there is a potential downside to this rhetorical conversion, “These fluid
transpositions could be typical of how the courtly style operates outside of any
institutional structure, and of how its separation from governmental functions has been
coincident with its becoming aligned with feminine representation,” (Hariman, Political
Style: The Artistry of Power, 1995, p. 86). In Chapter Four I look to a case study of the
visual imagery surrounding First Lady Michelle Obama’s body to investigate the way in
which this form of power may serve to reify strict constraints on women and their
exercise of power.

CHAPTER 4 VISUALITY AND THE PATHETIC FIRST LADY
In 2010 Mary E. Stuckey argued for a “rethinking” of the concept of the rhetorical
presidency, originally developed by Jeffrey Tulis in 1987, because “this model assumes a
white male president who governs within a pre-cable, pre-internet, political context”
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(2010, p. 38). Stuckey’s call is grounded in two primary observations of growing lacunae
in our understanding of the rhetorical aspects of political discourse. First, her recognition
of the faulty presumption of a white male president, suggests that our current rhetorical
theory lacks an ability to account for the changing level of diversity, in both race and
gender, in political representation. Stuckey explains this is not to say that race has not
been considered within annals of rhetorical presidency literature, “There are at least two
ways to treat race and the presidency- policy and the presidential body, and while we
have done significant work in one area, there is little in the other,” (p. 43).
In addition to race, Stuckey points out that our current understanding of the role
of the rhetorical presidency. “The presidency is an important site where our national
expectations of gender are performed and ritualized, but there are few studies that
examine this in any detail,” (p. 44). Subsequently, Stuckey argues we should expand this
form of analysis to female political actors like the first lady in a manner that surpasses the
influence of ‘pillow talk.’ “We know that political processes and institutions can be
gendered in important ways…just as we know that all presidents have been men, and that
this necessarily had an effect on the office. Yet when women and the executive branch
get studied, more often than not, it is because of the role of First Lady. There have been
some steps made in the direction of studying how women exercise executive power in
their own right (Martin & Borelli, 2000” (p. 44).
Second, Stuckey alludes to the influential manner in which cable and internet are
changing the way the public experiences our political leaders. This change is driven by
the visuality inherent to a 24-hour news cycle and the availability of the Internet,
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technologies that have a profound effect on the manner through which the first black
president is interpreted. She suggests, “Students of visual rhetoric may be able to discern
whether the depictions of this president differ from those of previous presidents, and if
so, to what those differences may be attributed, and how might they be best understood,”
(p. 43). The lack of filter could allow for constituents to construct their own
interpretations with less influence from the filtering mechanism of media.
In order to better understand these lacunae in our understanding of the theory of
the rhetorical presidency, and offer potential remedies that heed Stuckey’s call, I focus on
charting a rhetorical path toward this realization in this chapter. Of primary concern in
this chapter is substantiating the claim that the visual influence of a first lady lies in her
enthymematic potential to visually operate as a site for cultural negotiation through
pathetic rhetoric. Further concerns include potential ramifications of the pathetic realm on
the potential of the Office of the First Lady as a site for cultural negotiation as well as the
rhetorical power of the office as a whole.
The Political Body
Stuckey suggested that “There are too few studies of the embodied presidency and
there are productive possibilities in melding the study of the rhetorical presidency with
other areas in the field” (p. 49). To examine this idea, an idea rooted in a need for
understanding the way the body and all of its cultural meanings are influential in
presidential rhetoric, it is most conducive to look to McKerrow’s 1998 examination of
corporeality and cultural rhetoric. McKerrow begins by posing a question, “If rhetoric is
to re-fashion itself in responding to a culturally diverse world, what kind of theoretical
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orientation might it find as its ‘site’ from which to appraise it?” (p. 315). His first step in
answering this question is to remind us about the powers that have dominated, and so
constructed, western rhetoric. “Rhetoric is an expression of power, and power has been in
male hands for most of western history…Not only has Western Rhetoric denied women a
place, it also has, in privileging specific ‘sides’ of dichotomous binaries, severely limited
its applicability in a multi-cultural world” (p. 315). As previously examined in earlier
chapters, it is the process of binary thinking that has positioned concepts like pathos and
logos, rationality and emotion, and consequently men and women in opposition to each
other. McKerrow offers this comparison to articulate these oppositions:
Women/body/emotion/nature/private sphere
Men/mind/reason/culture/public sphere (p.317)
Clearly this division is problematic in numerous ways, but for the purpose of this
examination I focus on the way in which this cultural understanding limits a woman’s
potential to have agency in the public sphere, by providing a disciplining mechanism for
any woman that attempts to exert her voice in that sphere and on the ways that this
removes pathetic discourse from what’s understood as legitimate political rhetoric. In
order to traverse this troubling binary, McKerrow suggests that we must abandon this
manner of thinking through seeking an orientation that supersedes these oppressive
categories through a rhetoric situated in the embodied or corporeal aspects of political
presentation.
An important step in this pilgrimage is to examine how this binary operates with
respect to the presentation of body in our public and political spheres:
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As men participate in the public sphere, those in positions of power need concern
themselves less with bodily appearance than with the mind’s ability to give
expression to ideas…[that] has not been the fate of women in the public sphere,
further underscoring the mind/body split as women give expression to ideas in
orientation, an accessible public settings.” (p. 317).
When considering the rhetorical presidency, traditionally conceptualized in a white male
and evident way to diversify our rhetorical lens is to examine alternative members that
are active in the rhetorical presidency, namely the Office of the First Lady (OFL).
McKerrow argues, that it is through examination such as this that, “we come to terms
with rhetoric in places not currently included within the province of administrative
rhetoric. We also need to go beyond the province of women’s discourse to extend this
reversion to include people of color” (p. 317). In fact, the parallel is made clear through
an understanding of how the restriction of women and people of color operates through
the restriction on emotion because the association between these groups and the
characterization of emotionality was the rationale for excluding them from the public
sphere. In historical terms, this is what led to these groups being labeled as the ‘weaker’
in that they were asserted to lack the capacity for mental discipline. Women being
physically weaker served as a distraction and bonus, as this same accusation was not
waged against other sectors of minorities. Through the use of Michelle Obama, the first
African American to ascend to the Office of the First Lady, this chapter is able to explore
the potential of pathos.
First Lady Michelle Obama, the first black first lady, offers a unique opportunity
to inspect the intersection of race and gender through the presentation of body. In her
tenure she has advocated several campaigns, but most notably she officially launched her

	
  

88

first campaign as a first lady in 2010, “Let’s Move!” anti-obesity campaign with a speech
in which she set a goal of eliminating childhood obesity within a generation. Michelle
Obama’s presentation helps reveal a link between pathetic politics and the way she used
her body to underscore her proposed cultural and political changes.
Obama’s body first earned attention in the media in 2009 when she chose to wear
a sleeveless dress, an outfit that highlighted her well sculpted upper arms in her official
White House portrait:
The Washington Post reports that it has received hundreds of reader complaints
on the subject. A Chicago Tribune reader wrote of her outfit during the
president’s congressional address, “Does the lady not understand that these Big
Speech Events are serious and important? Not a cocktail party?” (Clark-Flory,
2009)
Newspaper columnist David Brooks wrote, “She’s made her point. Now she should put
away Thunder and Lightning…she should not be known for her physical presence”
(Farrell, 2011, p. 135). Since that initial controversy Obama’s physical body has had a
consistent presence in arguments and commentary related to the First Lady’s role in the
White House and more importantly to her role as a spokeswoman for her ‘anti-obesity’
campaign. I argue that Michelle Obama’s insertion of her own body as evidence for her
campaign represents an emerging topos in first lady rhetoric that may have substantial
impacts on our understanding of the rhetorical presidency as a whole.
Visual Rhetoric and the Body
When embarking on an examination of the body as a rhetorical construct, the role
of visuality provides a means to respond to Stuckey’s 2010 call for a better understanding
of the way cable and the internet have changed the way citizens interact within the
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political sphere. Returning to McKerrow’s articulation of the notion of ‘woman’ being
intimately tied to the ‘body’ and subsequently ‘emotion’ (pathos), it follows that this
analysis provides an avenue to investigate the pathetic power of the Office of the First
Lady and her subsequent ability to utilize that form of argumentation to traverse the
public and private spheres for political gain.
The study of visual rhetoric is a particularly fruitful place to begin this pursuit.
When considering the rhetorical potential of images in culture, it is prudent to
acknowledge the argument that western cultures are historically suspicious of images. In
1973 Sontag prolifically articulated our cultural distrust of images by arguing that their
power is deceptive in the emotional appeal they derive from a portrayal of ‘reality.’
“Both the order and the exact time for looking at each photograph are imposed; and there
is a gain in visual legibility and emotional impact” (p. 5). Mitchell (2005) explains that
theorists have been particularly vulnerable to falling into an iconoclastic mindset through
their, “ineluctable tendency of criticism itself to pose as an iconoclastic practice, a labor
of demystification and pedagogical exposure of false images,” (p. 8). It is this suspicion
of the emotional impact (pathos) of visuals that has fueled our cultural fear of images as
an advanced form of demagoguery.
This fear of pathetic potential is not dissimilar to the fear of the pathetic potential
of a woman and presentations of her body. W. J. T. Mitchell identifies the feminization of
the visual in his examination of the question ‘What do images want [from us]?’ [a phrase
that not coincidentally mirrors the popular incantation ‘What do women want?’] Mitchell
argues “Images are ‘kinds of pictures,’ classifications of pictures. Images are, then, like
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species, and pictures are like organisms whose kinds are given by the species” (p. 85).
Mitchell’s broad definitions and inclusion of a variety of forms of images, speaks to his
wish to focus on the relationship between image and spectator and what he calls “our
wish to penetrate them [images] and our fear of being swallowed up by them. (I trust that
there’s no need for me to comment on the heavy quotient of what is called male fantasy
in this scene)” (p. xvii). This is not to suggest that Obama is invoking the power of the
male gaze by purposefully using her body to attract attention. Further, it is not to suggest
that every body in the visual realm is inherently feminized, but instead it is to suggest that
it is the way in which we approach the image is masculinized. His eroticization and
personification of images as an attempt to argue that much of what images are is
dependent on how we treat them. Do we ignore, suppress, or revile them in the manner of
critics of the pathetic realm? Or do we accept the image and let it speak to its own desire?
Mitchell situates the image in a similar position to the female by arguing that the
critical issue may not be the image, but the spectatorship that encounters that image. This
perspective is similar to the one that Foss worked from in arguing that we should evaluate
images with respect to their function, “Images thus do not determine their own
interpretation but require interpretation” (Foss, 1994, p. 216). Accepting Mitchell and
Foss’s interpretation positions the importance of the image as experiential, in that the
image ‘calls’ to the spectator to see what they want to see and so may serve as a
productive reflective lens of culture. This ‘call’ to the spectator operates in a very similar
manner to the rhetorical device of the enthymeme examined in Chapter 2.
The Enthymeme and Visual Rhetoric
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Within the world of argumentation studies, the use and utility of visual rhetoric
has taken on greater significance in the past thirty years. Key to understanding the way in
which our evolving technology is changing the format and function of public discourse is
Aden’s 1994 argument that the effect of this advancement has brought us into a
postmodern realm of political discourse. He points to McGee’s conception of discourse
fragments through unarticulated frames, leaving contemporary audiences to fill in the
missing information through what is ‘already known’ to them (McGee, 1990). “As a
result, television viewers must rely on their own store of fragments to decode, interpret,
and evaluate televised arguments” (Aden, p. 55). Further, “Both content and form suggest
that arguments in postmodern cultures function deductively, relying upon audience
agreement of what’s already ‘known’ to create further agreement. “ (Aden, p. 56).
Despite widespread agreement on the importance of visual rhetoric, the role of
visual rhetoric within argumentation studies is questioned primarily due to a presumption
that a visual cannot argue in the same sense as verbal arguments. For example, in 1996
Fleming argued visuals lack the ability to assert a specific claim and supporting reasons.
In addition, he contends that images have no negative, therefore dismissing their potential
from the oppositional realm of argumentation (Fleming, 1996). However, a growing
amount of scholars has referenced classical rhetoric, specifically Aristotle’s topoi and
rhetorical devices to make the claim that we have understated visual’s connection to
argumentation. Smith (2007) explains, “When the enthymeme is understood more
broadly, visual communication can be classified as argumentation, thus enhancing the
credibility of visual persuasion” (p. 114).
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The pathetic power of the enthymeme and visual images lies in their ability to
promote engagement and eventual action. Aristotle understood this potential when he
credited the enthymeme in The Rhetoric as such, “Speeches that rely on examples are as
persuasive as the other kind, but which rely on enthymemes excite the louder applause”
(1356b, 20). That ‘excitement’ is pathos, but unlike in Sontag’s articulation, pathos is a
productive rhetorical source. Smith 2007 acknowledges the wealth of recent literature
that connects the enthymeme and visual rhetoric, but challenged that this is a modern or
popular conception to demonstrate the need for more literature to support this
understanding. Instead, arguing that Aristotle’s conception of the enthymeme allows for
visuality through the portrayal of probabilities presented through an image. “To be
persuasive, enthymemes must identify with the common opinions of their intended
audiences. Creators of visual enthymemes discover these common opinions in context
and culture, incorporating them into their messages” (Smith, 2007, p. 120). In sum, the
enthymeme’s rhetorical power operates in a similar manner as visual images; they invite
and construct engagement, which is a potent political power.
In order to substantiate the claim that the visual influence of a first lady lies in her
enthymematic potential to visually operate as a site for cultural negotiation through
pathetic rhetoric I turn to an analysis of images related to First Lady Michelle Obama.
Examination of the Obama Administration’s healthcare initiative as well as the First
Lady’s concurrent anti-obesity initiative provides a productive site to better understand
the way the OFL can assist the president in addressing the public through the means of
visual rhetoric. These initiatives are significant in that Obama’s healthcare plan focused
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on signing into law a piece of legislation (logos-centric) while the First Lady focused on
cultural awareness (imbued with pathos) through image events with speeches playing a
supportive role. This is not to say that the President and the First Lady solely used either
logo-centric or pathetic reasoning, but is instead to suggest that an analysis of their
individual emphasis is a productive endeavor.
Visualizing the First Lady
Caroli argues that “the United States presidency…includes two jobs that are
performed by separate individuals in other forms of representative governments: a head
of state who presides over ceremonial functions and a head of government who makes
major appointments and takes a decisive role in legislation” (1987, p. xviii). It is this
situation that has led presidents to offer their wives as a surrogate for their approval and
as a symbol for their control over their government. In effect, if the body of the president
is viewed as a reflection of the American people’s expectations, then he is expected to
focus on the cerebral, logos-based tasks, leaving the first lady to embody the ceremonial,
pathetic realm of the political sphere.
The ceremonial function of the presidency relies on presentation, and thus
visuality. However, Marton argues that this visuality is more than style, more than
hairdos and White House décor and inaugural gowns and controversies over china and
guest lists, instead she suggests that the role of presidential spouses is vital to a full
understanding of their husbands’ administrations and the presidency itself” as the first
lady serves as “a link to the real world from which his power and position isolate him”
(2001, pp. 3-4). Central to understanding the interpretive role of the first lady is an
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examination of the way in which the concept of the rhetorical presidency has been
applied to the Office of the First Lady.
Studies on the function and role of the first lady have adopted the theory of the
rhetorical president as a tool to assess the power of the first lady. Parry-Giles and Blair
(2002) argue that the rhetorical rise of the first lady is a “path that at once holds a
symbiotic relationship with the rhetorical presidency yet is unique in its own rhetorical
path and substance.” Essentially, that the OFL has a rhetorical function in that it operates
through intra-governmental interaction and the act of taking the message directly to the
people. However, the office is different in substance and style. The Constitution does not
allocate substantive or specific duties to the OFL, so the position has only been defined
through institutional custom and cultural expectations. Most important of those customs
and expectations is that messages disseminated from the OFL work to support the overall
goals and purposes of the president’s administration. Stylistically, the office differs
because it predominantly operates in the cultural sphere of public discourse. First Ladies
are routinely sent out to commemorations, memorials, dedications, and other rhetorical
events that have constructed the celebrity status of the office in our culture.
In 2011 Borrelli argued that “we know much more about what first ladies have
not done than about what they have consistently and routinely contributed to the
presidency” (p. 2). Borrelli’s statement highlights the prolific yet fragmented nature of a
scholarship that focuses on the role(s) and influence of the first ladies of the United
States. Past research has primarily been retrospective in that it has illuminated the way in
which first ladies have deviated from a general understanding of the cultural expectations
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for their office. In many cases this has been to the detriment of working toward a greater
understanding of the way in which this office has expanded and changed in modern
presidencies. Historically, the first lady is understood to act as the ‘leader of the nation’s
women,’ a title that supports a gendered conception of the office itself. Borrelli argues
that, “integral to these public expectations and to first lady priorities, are judgments about
gender, and gender role modeling (p. 3),” a fact that is highlighted by the juxtaposition of
the first lady to the office of the president, an office that “gender scholars have concluded
is arguably the most intensely masculine post in the United States government” (p. 2).
Interestingly, Marton notes how slowly this office has reacted to changing social norms,
“Ironically, while women have been breaking down the last remaining barriers toward
full equality, the first lady’s political role remains circumscribed” (Marton, 2001, p. 5).
Parry-Giles explained that women in politics often encounter a “double bind” in
that they are expected to portray the private sphere in the public sphere and this leads to a
situation in which a “woman [may] become so powerful they lose their femininity”
(2000, p. 208). Hayden (1999) argues that the female political representative negotiates
this paradoxical view of femininity by employing feminine style, “as a rhetorical strategy,
feminine style often reflects rhetors’ efforts to negotiate the power relations that gender
entails” (1999, p. 100). Feminine style is most notably understood as “a synthesis of form
and substance that works to promote an alternative political philosophy reflecting
traditionally feminine values,” essentially it is a style that promotes participatory action
and invokes a personal tone (Dow & Boor Tonn, 1993, p. 287). While some have
celebrated the recognition of the utilization and prevalence of feminine style, others have
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claimed that this sort of rhetorical compartmentalizing serves only to further marginalize
women. Hayden (1997) questioned whether a form “embraced by the dominant culture
can at the same time serve to challenge that culture” (1997, p. 137). Parry-Giles took this
argument a step further, “while most campaign rhetorics exhibit a ‘feminine style’ they
simultaneously rely upon prevailing masculine values and themes. Instead of resulting in
a feminized political sphere, contemporary campaign rhetorics reflect the continual
marginalization of women in the political process and the general exclusion of women
from political office and political power” (1996, p. 338). Additionally, while several
scholars have noted the adoption of feminine style by males to the delivery of political
speech, Parry-Giles argues that feminine style has served predominantly to change the
style of political speech and not the substance. With respect to the first lady, it is the
gendered conception of the office that links the position to feminine style, not necessarily
to women in general. The Office of the First Lady may in fact be one of the few sites left
that require a feminine style.
As argued in previous chapters, large-scale suspicion of the first lady is imbued
with patriarchal insecurities. More specifically, these criticisms illustrate the pervasive
fear that the rationalized, masculine, logos-centered Office of the President may be
defiled or contaminated by the emotional, pathos-centered nature of the Office of the
First Lady. The question that follows this marginalization of the pathetic appeal in
political discourse is ‘what are we missing when we examine the rhetorical presidency
through only a logo-centric connection to power and influence?’
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Some scholars, like Borrelli (2011) have looked past the role of the first lady as
purely ornamental and instead contend that the first lady serves an important
representative role in government because “rather than simply restating or explaining the
president’s words to the public, the first lady takes on the much more difficult and far
riskier task of interpreting one to the other” (2011, p. 211). Borelli’s position is a
development of this position as she argues “he embodies the best of the public sphere;
she embodies the best of the private sphere”, an argument that leads this analysis to
examine the way in which the first lady may act as interpreter between the public and
private spheres, through the visuality of her role (2011, p. 5).
Michelle Obama’s Body as Evidence
On March 20, 2009 Michelle Obama opened up at about her body to the New
York Times, “This is work…I have hips, and I have them covered up with these pleats
[skirt]” as part of an interview promoting her Let’s Move! Anti-Obesity program
(Burros). Michelle Obama’s utilized her body as a rhetorical response to critics of her
initiative, in that it represents a hyper-personal political style of the body as argument in
the light of rapidly changing political circumstances that both she and her husband face.
This critique is fueled by enthymematic rhetorical power as it is based on a comparative
analysis from the audience (public) on what is ‘already known’ relative to meanings
womanhood and black womanhood in the United States.
As Barack Obama ascended to the presidency in 2008 as the first black president
of the United States, his physical presence and that of his family’s entering the White
House, reflect changing cultural norms in our country. Collins (2012) explains the
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importance of this occurrence for the nation as a whole as well as the individual African
American, “African American families and First families have both been in the public
eye, albeit for ostensibly different reasons, the former as a site of what not to be if one
wished to achieve the American Dream, and the latter, a model of what one should try to
be in order to get there” (Just Another American Story? The First Black First Family,
2012).
Key to President Obama’s platform during the campaign was a promise to
institute national healthcare reform. As First Lady, Michelle Obama followed the
tradition of past first ladies and launched a program that she hoped would be
depoliticized. Her initiative, entitled “Let’s Move!” set out the goal of stamping out
childhood obesity in a single generation. Given the large-scale partisan critique of this
endeavor, it is plausible to concur that the visuality of the First Lady’s body, and its
presentation as evidence served as a foundation to contest her campaign. For instance,
prominent radio host Rush Limbaugh exclaimed:
Michelle, My Belle, minus the husband, took the kids out to Vail on a ski
vacation, and they were spotted eating and they were feasting on ribs, ribs that
were 1,575 calories per serving with 141 grams of fat per serving. She is a
hypocrite. Leaders are supposed to be leaders. If we’re supposed to go out and eat
nothing—if we’re supposed to eat roots, and berries and tree bark and so show us
how. And if it’s supposed to make us fit, if it’s supposed to make us healthier,
show us how. (Parton, 2015)
As the Washington Post explained of an Alabama high school football coach’s comments
on the First Lady’s body, “[he] is neither the first nor the most high-profile person to feel
moved to comment on the first lady’s physique….Rep. F. James Sensenbrenner, the
Wisconsin Republican, issued an apology after he was caught commenting on her ‘large
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posterior’” (Thompson, 2013). These remarks reflect the reality that in the United States
Michelle Obama’s body represents not just the physical ‘fitness’ of the female body, but
also the political ‘fitness’ of her visuality. “Her body nevertheless may evoke historical
and cultural meanings over which she cannot control” (Farrell p. 135).
Essentially, concepts of race, gender, class, and body are not inherent or intrinsic
to the study of a first ladies campaign to stamp out childhood obesity, but they are
important here because of the racialized response from certain sectors of the electorate to
her campaign. This racialized response arises from a gendered understanding of Michelle
Obama’s authority as national figurehead and takes exception to her potential role as a
national black mother. Clearly, these connections are tied the use of corporeality of the
First Lady’s body as evidence.
“Thus, rhetoric unbridled is womanly; rhetoric tamed is manly. In this
formulation, reason is the activity of a mind in control of its body; emotion is the activity
of the body only” (McKerrow, 1998, p. 317). In order to examine the rhetorical meanings
surrounding First Lady Michelle Obama’s presentation of her body as evidence, I return
to McKerrow’s articulation of a corporeal rhetoric, one in which he explains, “Before
subject is the body” (1998, p. 318). Further he explains, “To phrase it differently, bodies
are trapped inside cultures, and exhibit those acts promoted within the culture” (p. 319).
The way in which her body is critiqued and imbued with meaning, as well as used to
challenge those meanings is of utmost importance to this analysis, because as McKerrow
reminds us:
To consider the role of the body in ‘playing the part’ as well as the mind, and to
consider the fact that body and mind must be ‘together’ in the role, does not take

	
  

100

much imagination. Fitting into another culture, or even within our own culture,
requires a corporeal presence—an embodied sense of rhetoric as a performance
that one does, rather than as an analytical, objectified extension of who one is.
The prospect of fitting in raises another issue—what is our nature as human, and
how is that related to the culture in which we find ourselves. (p. 322-323)
Given the historical precedence of Michelle Obama’s time as first lady, Collins
(2000) concept of intersectionality is instructive as it reminds us:
Analysis claiming that systems of race, social class, gender, sexuality, ethnicity,
nation, and age form mutually constructing features of social organization, which
shape Black women’s experiences and, in turn, are shaped by Black women (p.
299).
Essentially, Collins’s admonition makes the point that a black women’s experience is not
necessarily every black woman’s experience. The intersection between gender and race is
further delineated by the added intersection of class. As the notion of class in and of itself
has spurred numerous renderings of its impact in this world, for the purpose of this study
I conceptualize class broadly. Scott and Leonhardt (2010) explain that:
One difficulty in talking about class is that the word means different things to
different people. Class is rank, it is tribe, it is culture and taste. It is attitudes and
assumptions, a source of identity, a system of exclusion. To some it is just money.
It is an accident of birth that can influence the outcome of a life. Some Americans
barely notice it others feel its weight in powerful ways. (p. 117)
Intersectionality, while essential as a theoretical component, is nevertheless difficult to
address without a proper locus for examination that resembles these intersections.
Returning to McKerrow’s conceptualization of a corporeal rhetoric, Stuckey’s 2010 call
for an embodied understanding of the rhetorical presidency, and the overarching pursuit
of pathos in our rationalized world leads this analysis to the body.
In order to attempt to account for the representation of these identities within the
images I will draw from two primary texts for the analysis. The first is Susan Bordo’s
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Unbearable Weight in which she articulates the intersection of body, race, and feminism.
The second is drawn from Amy Erdman Farrell’s work Fat Shame that offers a focus on
the physical body and the presidency to help frame the discussion of images of Michelle
Obama’s body. In this effort I engage images of Obama that were included in news
articles and opinion editorials related to her campaign.
Michelle Obama officially launched her Let’s Move campaign in February 2010
and since that time numerous images of her involvement with the campaign have been
proliferated throughout the media and have contributed to her public persona. Traditional
conceptions of the body in relationship to construction of citizenship place the body
squarely in the private sphere. However, the Obama’s emphasis on the health of the body
in their respective initiatives provides an opportunity to investigate how a logo-centric
and pathetic body argument may intersect at the level of values that are being negotiated.
Given the publicity of the first lady and her anti-obesity initiative, analysis of her body
has been elevated from a level of media abstraction to a form of evidence supporting her
overall aim.
Thus far in the campaign, two dominant image types have been prevalent on the
national stage: images of Obama’s body moving and her body consuming. Respectively,
these images represent the very paradox that the OFL represents, the act of acting
privately, publicly or moving from the private to the public sphere. As a point of analysis
I take on Bordo’s 1993 explanation of the “quest archetype” in which they depict “the
heroine’s commitment, will, and spiritual integrity through the metaphors of weight loss,
exercise, and tolerance of and ability to conquer physical pain and exhaustion,” but are
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brought into clearer focus when identities of race and body-based discrimination are
included in the picture (p. 196).
The Private Body Moving in Public
The first set of images focuses on Obama’s body as she enacts the very lifestyle
changes she supports. Previous first ladies’ campaigns have included strategic photo-ops
that show the first lady posing with a representative of their respective public awareness
campaigns in positions that support traditional gender roles of the first lady as decorative
object (Caroli 1987; Borelli 2011). However, images of Obama encourage an interactive
approach that highlights her physical form in a way that has the potential to challenge
traditional conceptions of the First Lady. Central to the promotion of the campaign are
images that highlight Michelle Obama as an active, healthy, slender woman and mother
of color. Farrell argues that traditionally the physically fit and muscular body has been
associated with racial identity to involve, “primitive behaviors, atavistic impulses, and
low class position” (Farrell p. 133). However, Farrell goes on to explain that recently the
slender body has come to offer a “promise to hoist a person into the realm of the ‘most
civilized body’ and to erase the cultural meaning of other stigmatized physical
characteristics” like race (Farrell p. 131). It is important to note that the slender body
offers a ‘promise’ and not necessarily a solution to the dominance of race classifications
and stereotypes. Bordo argues that there are two dominant body stereotypes commonly
enacted: the first of a racialized, strong, and animalistic body that stands in contrast to
more modern conceptions of the slender and physically fit body as a symbol of the
“glamorized and sexualized yuppie” elite (Bordo p. 195). Images of Obama working with
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her Let’s Move! program reveal the tension between Bordo’s two stereotypes. The
images focus on Obama in slim fitting workout clothes playing sports, racing, dancing,
hula hooping, and being physically active with children around the country. In contrast to
previous images of the first lady feminine ideal in which the body remains in an ordered
and coiffed manner, in images of Obama we see her hair tousled while running for a
touchdown pass, sweat on her brow after the finish of a relay race, and even depictions of
her muscles straining as she moves through the steps of a dance routine. In these images
Obama depicts feminine equality as she races side by side with a man but those images
are tempered by the traditional elements of nurture through a mother narrative as she is
surrounded by the children she is trying to help.
Additionally, racial stereotypes are made even more problematic as the viewer
encounters the strength of Obama through her body. These images allow the viewer to
invoke traditional stereotypes about the muscular raced body in a way that provides a
license that would not be afforded for viewers encountering the body of a white first lady.
The strength of the racial stereotype can be seen as dominant in these images given the
commentary surrounding Michelle Obama. This is the case because while Bordo may
maintain that a muscular body can depict either primitive or yuppie stereotypes, it
appears that the depiction of race with respect to First Lady Michelle Obama is dominant
in the many caricatures of her comparing her likeness to animals. It is important to realize
that identities of race and gender do not operate in isolation, but instead they are informed
by and inform body-based discrimination and conceptions of the powerful elite body of
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the first lady in order to open up the possibility of future reconstructions of stereotypes
and problematic values.
The Private Body Consuming in Public
In contrast to the first set of image types in which Obama is seen expelling energy
through exercise, the second set of image types depicts Obama consuming foods. Bordo
notes that, “Some writers have argued that female hunger (as a code for female desire) is
especially problematized during periods of disruption and change” (Bordo p. 206).
Bordo’s notation is eerily prophetic when applied to Obama’s detractors in times of
strong partisan divide, because as Anderson explained the first lady must, “develop a
social style that [is] rhetorically responsive to the political situations they (and their
husbands) face” (p. 2). Bordo looks to Douglas to take this argument further, “images of
the ‘microcosm’-the physical body- may symbolically reproduce central vulnerabilities
and anxieties of the ‘macrocosm’-the social body” (Bordo p. 186). Several groups have
utilized images of Obama eating fast food to promote the argument that she is a hypocrite
when it comes to healthy eating, most notably when Obama was criticized for eating a
1,700 calorie fast food meali. However, it is interesting to note that Obama’s detractors
have not limited themselves to images of her eating unhealthy foods; in fact several
images depict Obama eating foods that cannot be clearly identified. These images are
problematic because they put on display the desire (hunger) of a woman, which generally
calls attention to her as a black woman, and specifically as the first black First Lady.
Notably, Bordo argues that the power of the body as a site for identity negotiation is in
the ability of the body to contain and offer multiple interpretations (pp. 206-207). This

	
  

105

may be especially important in the case of the politicization of Michelle Obama’s body
through images related to her public awareness campaign. Those on either extreme of the
political and cultural spectrum may see in these images an empowered black female that
represents a coming cultural shift or possibly an indulgent exception to cultural norms
that represents a deviant of the preferred system.
Conclusion
This analysis of the visual rhetorical messaging of Michelle Obama’s body
supports three primary implications for the study of pathos in politics and the study of the
first lady. First, the visual analysis of the cultural reflections highlighted by the images of
Michelle Obama’s body supports the continuing argument that the Office of the First
Lady remains a marginalized position through which barriers are constructed in an
attempt to contain the gendered political actor. The very fact that images of a strong,
female, black, woman displaying her body has caused so much discussion and criticism
throughout our public sphere illustrates that these biases are still strong. However, her
rhetoric has the potential to operate in these spaces by challenging their assumptions
about the form and function of a first lady. She manages this by operating rhetorically in
a space that presents and body rhetoric that is irreconcilable with those stereotypes.
Ultimately, this strategy leads to a place where the biases are more visible as stereotypes,
based on faulty assumptions and generalizations.
Second, this chapter offers analysis of a rhetor interacting with public deliberation
through representations of their own body, and so it follows that this work adds to the
wealth of literature that highlights the personal/private sphere focus of female political
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actors. The expansion of persona to include the corporeality of the body represents a
hyper-personalized rhetoric that may have substantial impacts for the rhetor as they are
called on to not only account for what they think, but what they are. This is primarily due
to the nature of the body, as it is perceived by the audience through mediated images.
Finally, the way in which visuals of the body can stand in for the unsaid premise of the
political discourse surrounding the Obama Administration speaks volumes to the
enthymematic value fueling these controversies. Essentially, critique and discussion
centering on Michelle’s body as being deviant, different, not fit to serve as an example
for Americans, can be viewed in the following enthymematic structure:
Premise: Michelle Obama’s body is deviant from cultural images of first ladies.
Hidden Premise: First ladies bodies should resemble past (white) first ladies.
Conclusion: She is not a good first lady.
Visuals and images are rhetorically useful in that they can act “as a mediating
element “in the social and political relations amongst citizens” (Azoulay p. 39).
Essentially visuals have the power to begin a civic conversation but they also allow the
viewer access to a variety of social stereotypes that they may bring to the image.
However, the nature of images also further corroborates how the body is a valuable site
for the negotiation of multiple types of identity and through the images of Obama may
represent that our culture is going through a period of intense social change. Researchers
must remain adept to these rapid social upheavals and so train their analyses to look
beyond traditional conceptions in order to account for social and cultural change.
Finally, this analysis counters the body of literature that has largely dismissed the
influence of the Office of the First Lady as purely ornamental and without substance. As
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scholars investigating the rhetorical nature of the presidency it is not only prudent but
wise to respond to Stuckey’s 2010 call for “less codification and more new thinking”
(2010, p. 39). I have attempted to do that by viewing the rhetorical presidency as more
expansive then the individual president and instead have hoped to glean more
understanding into the way that other key actors in the administration contribute to the
rhetorical goals of the president. What seems common in past analyses of the OFL is the
emphasis on an instrumental rhetorical approach that values logos above pathos and ethos
to the detriment of a better understanding of the craft.

CHAPTER 5 PATHETIC POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS
In this work I drew from Stuckey’s 2010 call to shape the primary goals of this
project, she argued “for a “rethinking” of the concept of the rhetorical presidency because
“this model assumes a white male president who governs within a pre-cable, pre-internet,
political context” (p. 38). The theory of the rhetorical presidency has a long and
venerable history within rhetorical studies. However, it is precisely because of the
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longevity and appreciation for this theory that affords my analysis utility. Stuckey
explains, “Yet, when a history becomes well-known and standard, it can also become
stale, and can serve more to codify than advance a field of study,” (2010, pp. 38-39). In
order to begin this work I started with a spotlight on the growing importance of images
and image making in our society. This importance is seen in the impact of images on
discourses involved in the societal negotiation of meaning related to citizenship, gender,
and the body.
In order to analyze these rhetorical constructions I identified the Office of the
First Lady (OFL) as a productive site to investigate the potential power of a presidential
administration to have impact on these discourses. What was quickly apparent in that
analysis is that although a first lady is not afforded direct power through designations
from the Constitution; the office does have the potential to access power through
alternative means. In the case of a first lady, she is constantly positioned as a
complimentary opposite of the president. Were she to be too masculine, assertive, or lack
a feminine requirement in any way she is criticized for encroaching on the president’ s
territory. Therefore, it follows that if the presidency is considered a masculine post and so
is expected to act through the “hard power” of logos-centric policy making.

This

assertion positions the OFL to take up the complimentary opposite in pathos. However,
given the denigration of pathos as a “real” or “legitimate” form of power in the rhetorical
sense the OFL’s potential to access and act on this rhetorical basis has rarely been
recognized as important. In an attempt to correct this error, I went back to the basics,
exploring the adventures of logos and pathos throughout rhetorical history. Ultimately,
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finding that a pathetic politics has the potential to afford greater understanding to
discourses surrounding citizenship, gender, and the body.
In Chapter Two I wanted to identify potential avenues of access to the realm of
pathetic politics. I began with Aristotle’s original conceptualization of rhetorical proofs
as logos, pathos, and ethos. Reexamining Aristotle’s writing found that a limited
interpretation of Aristotle’s conceptualization of pathos is in part to blame for the
denigration of pathos over the subsequent two thousand years. Key to articulating an
alternative reading of Aristotle was questioning an interpretation of his designation of the
rhetorical device, the enthymeme, as strictly under the purview of logos. In the remaining
matters of the chapter I argued that the enthymeme might be a key to identifying ways
that a rhetor may access the pathetic realm of political rhetoric. In addition, this potential
revelation suggested that because of the parallels between the denigration of pathos and
women and minorities, a greater recognition for pathos could continue expanding the
rhetorical recognition and opportunities for these sectors of society.
In Chapter Three I sought to chart the source of the rhetorical power fueling
pathetic politics. This mission took me back in time to the height of monarchial politics
with Hariman’s articulation of “political style.” In his work Hariman argues that the
courtly style of political power was situated in the proximity to the body of the sovereign
or king. While he suggests that the power related to courtly style of politics lived on past
the fall of monarchies, he doesn’t offer any thoughts on what happens to the power rooted
in the proximity to the king. Bringing Foucault into conversation with Hariman provided
insight into that matter. By drawing from Foucault’s theory of bio-power, a power that is
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said to gain prominence at the fall of the monarchies revealed that power did not
disappear but instead may lay in wait until accessed by political actors in modern forms
of democratic governance. More specifically, this analysis supports the primary thesis
that the proximal power derived from ‘around’ the body of the sovereign transitions
through the influence of bio-power to rhetorical power positioned ‘in’ the body of
members of the populace. In terms of the OFL this transition is seen through her
leveraging her proximal power to the body of the president in a manner that builds
pathetic rhetorical power in her own body. Further, it supports the idea that the OFL is
uniquely situated to access this pathetic realm of politics through a body rhetoric that
capitalizes on the visual nature of her office.
In Chapter Four, I drew on prominent images of Michelle Obama to explore her
exercise of a body rhetoric in support of her anti-obesity initiative as well as the overall
goals of her husband’s administration.

In this effort I drew from McKerrow’s 1998

concept of corporeal rhetoric as well as various theories from visual rhetoric to illuminate
Obama’s style of body rhetoric. Connections were made between the pathetic enthymeme
and the power of images producing the contention that the visual influence of a first lady
lies in her enthymematic potential to visually operate as a site for cultural negotiation
related to discourses surrounding citizenship, gender, and the body.
A primary conclusion in this chapter is that visual analysis of cultural reflections
and stereotypes initiated by interaction with images of Michelle Obama’s body supports
the continuing argument that the OFL remains a marginalized office through which
barriers are constructed in an attempt to contain the gendered political actor. Further,
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Chapter 3 and 4 work to diagram the process through which Michelle Obama’s rhetoric
opens up her own body for refutation based on elements of social control rooted in
biopower. In turn, this rhetorical act is also a precursor to the engagement of savage
rhetoric, characterized by a vitriolic tone and rampant personal attacks, that is engaged
primarily because of the body is not thought of as a traditional mode of rhetoric.
Finally, the culmination of the work to this point serves to counter the body of
literature that has largely dismissed the influence of the Office of the First Lady as purely
ornamental and without significant rhetorical power. In some ways the central thesis of
this work is not revolutionary, in that I make no claim to have discovered a resurgence of
pathetic argumentation surrounding the rhetorical presidency, but instead I contend that
pathos has always been and will continue to have an important role in political decisionmaking. In addition, it is a misreading of this work to believe that my arguments support
the conclusion that logos is no longer important. Instead, this work joins the growing
chorus of voices that want to collapse the binary between logos and pathos.

The Episteme of Pathetic Politics
There is an ever-present irony in United States democratic politics that exists
because of our modernist insistence that democracy will persevere through the promise of
logos. This idea is fueled by an idealistic homage to the power of logos; the hope that
democracy will thrive because the majority will always be able to identify the better
logos-based argument. This assertion has limited our practical and academic
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understanding of the intricacy of political decision-making by obfuscating the rhetorical
power of pathos in our public discourse.
The irony of attempting to banish pathos from democracy is readily available in
the very words we use to justify the pursuit of democratic governance. In the founding
documents of American democracy, like the Declaration of Independence and the
Constitution, it is purported that democratic rule is a vehicle to achieve ideals of liberty,
freedom, and the pursuit of happiness. Given how broadly these terms are defined, their
epistemological function is largely pathetic. We know these concepts by how we feel
them, many times we ‘feel them’ in our gut, an allusion to the perception of authenticity
connected to bodies.
Further, considering the expectations of citizens in a democracy reveals the need
for lively citizen engagement in order for the system to thrive. By definition a citizen
lacking pathos is an apathetic citizen, the very antithesis of civic engagement, which is an
essential component to democratic success. Tracing the trajectory of this line of
argumentation, it follows that pathos is an integral part of any democratic structure. The
overarching lesson is that we can no longer ignore the influence of emotion in our
democracy and hope it goes away. Democracy cannot survive on logos alone primarily
because the work of citizenship requires pathos. This work is largely pathetic in nature
due to the strong rhetorical impact of imagery as well as the epistemic function of pathos
in that when it comes to engaging in an imagined collective often we know because we
feel. In this concluding chapter I want to take a look at how a pathetic political lens
reveals how embodiment might get translated into a speech in a traditional text.
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First Lady Michelle as Political Surrogate
In the 2016 presidential election First Lady Michelle Obama was repeatedly
tapped to act as a surrogate for presidential contender Hillary Clinton. I draw from two
primary texts to show how she relies on the translation of embodiment an, her speech at
the 2016 Democratic National Convention and her remarks on a scandal related to the
presidential campaign of Donald Trump. Taken together, I argue that her remarks in these
speeches can be seen as a culmination of her brand of pathetic politics, a politics that
emphasizes the epistemic function of pathetic rhetoric related to visuals and the body.
During the 2016 Democratic National Convention First Lady Michelle Obama
took on a prominent role as surrogate for the democratic presidential candidate Hillary
Clinton. Throughout her role as a surrogate for Hillary Clinton, headlines in the media
praised Obama’s rhetoric as consequential, at times even more so than the President’s
rhetorical surrogacy. The New York Times opinion columnist Frank Bruni praised what
he described as, “The authentic power of Michelle Obama” (Bruni, 2016). The Guardian
declared, “She found her voice” describing the DNC address as a “thunderbolt
convention address [that] has been applauded as authentic, uncompromising and
political” (Graves & Smith, 2016).
Michelle Obama’s rhetoric is notable not only for its historical precedence, a
speech given by a sitting First Lady in support of a former first lady and first female
presidential candidate to earn the nomination from a major party, but also for the
widespread celebration of its rhetorical appeal labeled among many political pundits as
authentic. The term authenticity is constantly volleyed around the political and rhetorical
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realms, however it is often done so in a nebulous manner. For a political rhetor, it is an
aspiration and an honor to achieve. In the terminology of rhetorical studies it is usually
conceived of as either synonymous with or an element of a speaker’s ethos. For Michelle
Obama and the political discourse that surrounds her, this label can be understood as an
actualization of her rhetorical potential, an actualization that relies on an emphasis of the
visual in her narratives.
In her speech at the DNC the first lady made several claims connecting her
support of Clinton with concern over the future of the nation’s youth. Utilizing the
established pathetic lens reveals how Obama’s rhetoric relies on two primary elements.
First, the image as articulated through the act of looking or witnessing the ascendency to
the White House. Second, Obama focuses her image narrative in a critical manner that
challenges the audience to interact with what they are looking at:
That is the story of this country, the story that has brought me to this stage
tonight, the story of generations of people who felt the lash of bondage, the shame
of servitude, the sting of segregation, but who kept on striving and hoping and
doing what needed to be done so that today, I wake up every morning in a house
that was built by slaves--(applause)-- and I watch my daughters -- two beautiful,
intelligent, black young women – playing with their dogs on the White House
lawn. (Obama, Transcript: Michelle Obama's DNC speech, 2016)
In this passage Natalle’s three terms are on display through the visual narrative of
Michelle waking up in the White House. The analogy relies heavily on location, in that it
invites the audience into her everyday life. As she describes the most mundane of life,
she chronicles not only the wonder of waking up in the White House, but the importance
of who she is waking up in the White House, a black woman and a descendent of slaves.
This argument is built on the act of seeing and the need for critical reflection of what is
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being seen. Her paralleling her two young daughters with a narrative of slavery has the
power to invoke emotions across a broad range. Guilt or shame may be invoked through
the visual laden terminology such as “lash of bondage…sting of servitude,” both
allusions centered on acts upon the body. However, through the insertion of her daughters
playing on the White House lawn a salve is offered for the emotional tumult suggested by
the previous passage. Basically it can be read as ‘look how far we have come.’
Summarily, this passage emphasizes the power of the rhetorical visual and frames
their presence in the White House as a national accomplishment and foundation for a call
to communal agency. Chronologically, her presence in the White House is situated within
the narrative of those that “felt the lash of bondage…[but] kept on striving and hoping
and doing.” What is key to Obama’s embodied narrative is that not only does she place
herself in the White House through visuality and the body, but she offers the people a
place as well, as witness to history with agency over the future of this country.
On October 13, 2016 Michelle Obama delivered a campaign speech at Southern
New Hampshire University in her functional capacity of surrogate for Hillary Clinton.
However, the form of Obama’s speech extended beyond barnstorming tactics to motivate
constituents. Instead, Obama utilized this occasion to directly respond to recent
allegations of sexual harassment waged against Hillary’s opponent, Donald Trump.
Obama’s words in New Hampshire provide a lucid text through which we can investigate
the intersection of rationality and pathos.
Rhetorical investigation of Michelle Obama’s speech reveals that this nexus
occurs at the negotiation of communal values. The accusations against Trump primarily
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center on the release of a recording revealing Trump commenting on a woman’s body
and recalling times that he has grabbed women without explicit consent (Transcripts:
What the mic caught Donald Trump saying in 2005 and what he said in his apology,
2016). Obama begins by explaining that she is compelled to speak to this issue instead of
her usual campaign stump speech:
So I’m going to get a little serious here, because I think we can all agree that this
has been a rough week in an already rough election. This week has been
particularly interesting for me personally because it has been a week of profound
contrast (Obama, Remarks by the First Lady at Hillary for America Campaign
Event in Manchester, Nh, 2016).
Obama then goes on to parallel the experience of hearing Trump’s words in the same
week of celebrating the International Day of the Girl and her initiative Let Girls Learn.
Essentially, she justifies her rhetorical choice to speak directly to the accusations against
Trump through the emotions evoked by experiencing the event. By this choice of political
positioning Obama situates herself as a witness to the political spectacle, similar to that of
a private citizen, rather than a member of the political elite.
From this, Obama recounts her message to those girls, a message that is revealed
as the thesis of her speech in New Hampshire. “And I told them that they deserve to be
treated with dignity and respect, and I told them that they should disregard anyone who
demeans or devalues them, and that they should make their voices heard in the world,”
(Obama, Remarks by the First Lady at Hillary for America Campaign Event in
Manchester, Nh, 2016). The potential for Obama to assist in the negotiation of American
values is illuminated in this passage. This potential is pathetic in nature and supported by
three primary rhetorical techniques: her rhetoric is experiential, the nature of “truth” is
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intimately tied to the physical body, and her rhetoric involves the direct invocation of
emotions. Taken together these three rhetorical moves work together to form an
epistemological form of ‘knowing’ that operates as justification for political action.
First, Obama’s rhetoric is experiential in nature. She has positioned herself
primarily not as a woman married to the President of the United States, but instead as a
citizen witnessing political events in concert with the American people:
And now, here I am, out on the campaign trail in an election where we have
consistently been hearing hurtful, hateful language about women—language that
has been painful for so many of us, not just as women, but as parents trying to
protect our children and raise them to be caring, respectful adults, and as citizens
who think that our nation’s leaders should meet basic standards of human
decency. (Obama, Remarks by the First Lady at Hillary for America Campaign
Event in Manchester, Nh, 2016)
In this passage Obama’s positioning of herself as a citizen is buoyed by her allusion to
her role as a mother and her call to a set of values that she labels “basic standards of
human decency.” This allows for the construction of an invitation to the audience to
transcend past politics to more immortal truths or values. She further supports her
argument by mirroring the incredulity that some felt in witnessing the 2016 presidential
campaign and by utilizing the unifying term of ‘we.’ “And last week, we saw this
candidate actually bragging about sexually assaulting women. And I can’t believe I am
saying that a candidate for the President of the United States has bragged about sexually
assaulting women,” (Obama, Remarks by the First Lady at Hillary for America
Campaign Event in Manchester, Nh, 2016).
Second, Obama suggests a way of knowing that is intimately tied to the physical
body. Obama justifies her decision to speak in this manner and about this topic with a
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reference to her physiological reaction to the accusations; “It has shaken me to my core in
a way that I couldn’t have predicted,” (Obama, Remarks by the First Lady at Hillary for
America Campaign Event in Manchester, Nh, 2016). However, it is the following passage
where she combines the experiential with the physical that is particularly revealing of her
rhetoric strategy:
It’s frightening. And the truth is, it hurts. It hurts. It’s like that sick, sinking
feeling you get when you’re walking down the street minding your own business
and some guy yells out vulgar words about your body. Or when you see that guy
at work that stands just a little too close, stares a little too long, and makes you
feel uncomfortable in your own skin. (Obama, Remarks by the First Lady at
Hillary for America Campaign Event in Manchester, Nh, 2016)
Through this passage Obama identifies the affront by Trump’s words as a wound waged
against women. The importance of this metaphor, word as wound, is that it highlights the
visual through the damage done to the body. Essentially, women may know it is wrong
because they can feel it is wrong. The connection of epistemology or mind and body is
cemented through the visceral feeling of violation. She goes on, “We’re trying to keep
our heads above water,” a line that calls forth ideas of survival and loss of voice. Further
she connects this wound to future generations by questioning, “If all this is painful to us
as grown women, what do you think this is doing to our children?” (Obama, Remarks by
the First Lady at Hillary for America Campaign Event in Manchester, Nh, 2016).
Obama’s use of experiential and physical knowledge culminates with direct
invocation of emotions through primarily pathetic appeals. She characterizes Trump’s
words as “hateful and hurtful” and as “shameful comments about our bodies” (Obama,
Remarks by the First Lady at Hillary for America Campaign Event in Manchester, Nh,
2016). Trump’s words are likened to a violation when she argues, “It’s that feeling of
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terror and violation that too many women have felt when someone has grabbed them, or
forced himself on them and they’ve said no but he didn’t listen” (Obama, Remarks by the
First Lady at Hillary for America Campaign Event in Manchester, Nh, 2016).
In sum, Obama’s argument is one of transcendent values, values that extend
beyond politics. She supports her argument through evidence that relies on a pathetic
frame of epistemological knowledge through her emphasis on experience, the body, and
emotions. This framing of words as physical wounds connects the mind and body and
positions Hillary Clinton as the candidate with the potential to heal those physical
affronts.
We need someone who will heal the wounds that divide us…The fact that Hillary
embodies so many of the values…In our hearts, we all know that if we let
Hillary’s opponent win this election, then we are sending a clear message to our
kids that everything they’re seeing and hearing is perfectly okay.” (Obama,
Remarks by the First Lady at Hillary for America Campaign Event in Manchester,
Nh, 2016)
Use of the pathetic political lens reveals what our insistence on a preference for logoscentric presidential rhetoric misses, the experiential and embodied claims that operate on
the level of value. She gains access to the pathetic realm through the use of her body as
an enthymematic source of political claims. In Chapter 3 I draw from Hariman to show
how a woman’s power is unique from men’s in that her power must first be dispersed
before it can be reconstituted as a whole. As a woman acting on a very public stage next
to the most powerful position in the country, Michelle Obama’s power was likely to be
dispersed through interrogation of her body. Obama chose to engage in this process and
was able to reconstitute her rhetorical power by leveraging her proximity to the president
to gain visuality for her claims in the eyes of the populace.
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Analysis of Michelle Obama’s rhetoric as a surrogate for Hillary Clinton’s
presidential campaign shows the epistemic function of pathos in action, she justifies the
audience knowing because they feel. This invocation of emotions is driven by her use of
embodiment and is a rhetorical tactic that promotes the work of citizenship and the idea
that democracy cannot survive on logos alone.
Implications for the Office of the First Lady
This investigation serves to counter the body of literature that has largely
dismissed the influence of the Office of the First Lady as purely ornamental and thus
without substance. Through a closer examination this critique is based in large part on a
modernist fear and denigration of pathetic rhetoric. Essentially, the critique states that
because the OFL is not expected to have influence on policy (logos), then she lacks
political power. As the concept of the rhetorical presidency explains, the primary power
of any presidential explanation is rhetorical in nature. By excavating Aristotle’s
explanation of rhetorical proofs and the subsequent conclusion that he did not offer that
categorization as a hierarchy, reveals the fallacy of this criticism for the OFL. Accepting
the idea that the pathetic realm interacts with the logos-centric realm in all forms of
persuasion, requires the acceptance that the pathetic is neither purely ornamental or
without substance.
Second, this work supports the identification of a hyper-personalized form of
rhetoric born from the intersection of visual and the body in the form of embodiment. For
Michelle Obama, this type of rhetoric is particularly useful in her representational role.
Borelli (2011) offered the thesis that a primary function of the OFL is representational
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between a president and the people. The presidential role relies heavily on logos to
suggest prescriptions for the nation and a first lady has the opportunity to embody or
perform those logos-centric ideas to the American people.
Finally, despite the productive power of this type of OFL rhetoric, visual analysis
of the cultural reflections highlighted by the images of Michelle Obama’s body supports
the continuing argument that the Office of the First Lady remains a marginalized position
through which barriers are constructed in an attempt to contain the gendered political
actor.
Beyond the Office of the First Lady
Although this work has focused on the Office of the First Lady’s pathetic
potential, the larger implications from this analysis extend well beyond that office. Going
beyond the Office of the First Lady requires a collapse of the binary between pathos and
logos. It should be said that his implication joins a broad body of critical work that seeks
to break binaries throughout societies in order to offer voice and emancipatory potential
to minorities. In Chapter 2 this work began by drawing from Fortenbaugh’s historical and
rhetorical excavation of Aristotle’s time in the Academy of Plato. He argues that during
this time pathos was not seen as irrational because a rationality of emotion was accepted
in the process of decision-making. In modern times we may call this a form of emotional
decision-making, but it stems from this classical idea that emotion can be related to
rationality. This idea has the potential to reorganize our understanding of the relationship
between pathos and logos, eventually collapsing the binary.

	
  

122

The above thesis can and should be applied to theories related to political
decision-making. Recognition of the potential of embodied rhetoric to assist in this
endeavor highlights the idea that the way we talk about and produce meanings related to
American bodies informs our politics, and vice versa. Key to this consideration is the
need to reintegrate the utilization of pathos into rationalized perspectives of political
decision-making. Clearly, within this idea are implications for argumentation theory as a
w hole. Of primary concern is the possibility for advancement on how we understand the
body as refutation. By identifying the visual rhetoric as a unique type of embodied
argument I suggest that the various ways that Obama does this is different from previous
articulations of this rhetorical strategy of enactment5. The functional difference is that
Obama’s body rhetoric involves her using her body to visually refute the claim that the
body doesn’t matter. Therefore serving as further grounds to collapse the binary between
mind and body, in that it’s emotional and physical not rational and mental.
This is not to suggest that this work is the first to recognize that pathos has always
existed in our political discourse. However, it does argue for an end to the binary debates
that attempt to label pathos as good or bad for political discourse and instead to recognize
that what is missing is an understanding and to some extent, an appreciation of, the
pathetic realm of these issues.
As for the political realm, this work offers insight into alternative means of proof,
action, and motivation with respect to political decision-making. In the introduction to
this work I noted that the 2106 election revealed a phenomenon that many media and
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political analysts are calling a “post truth” or “fake news” phenomenon. Namely, that
Trump’s victory revealed there are grounds to say we are learning from the outset of his
administration that there are a lot of people who don’t care about rational, logical,
argument. Expansion of the ideas brought forth in this work may assist in understanding
the politics of the era in that absolute dissent can be articulated as an active and
preferable form of citizenship for some citizens.
Finally, this work joins feminist theorists criticism of Habermas’s concept of the
public sphere as exclusionary and never really existing at all. Habermas’s
mischaracterization is in part due to a lack of understanding on pathos’ role. Pathos has
always been important. Even in the time period that Habermas uses to explain his ideal of
the public sphere he ignores readily available evidence of pathos’s impact. Habermas’s
purely logos centric account of this time period is an ad hoc rationalization at best. At
worst, it is complicit in further marginalization of minority voices.
Pathos must be developed so that theories like Habermas’s can be refined and
extended in a way that is more indicative of democratic processing. Developing pathos
will compliment the already existing development of logos, which provides a way for
rhetorical theorists to better understand things like affective citizenship and embodiment.
Theories related to the public sphere will only become more relevant as it is
reconceptualized as being more about emotion, embodiment, and pathos than previously
suggested.
Limitations and Future Research
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A primary limitation to this research is found in the nature of the Office of the
First Lady. Essentially, each first lady takes on the role of first lady to the degree that
they choose based on their personality and preferences. In this work I have noted that I
am not seeking longitudinal affirmation of this form of first lady rhetoric. However, I do
see it as a fruitful pursuit for future research to investigate past and future first ladies to
ascertain the degree to which they engage in pathetic politics. Anomalies and differing
degrees of engagement are to be expected, but this line of research still has the potential
to enrich our knowledge of pathetic politics as a whole.
Second, this work draws from a context where the Offices of the President and
First Lady remain highly gendered by the male/female dichotomy. As social contexts
change, future reassessment will be important to gauge how an evolution of this situation
may impact the availability of pathetic politics to different political actors. This evolution
may come in the form of a female president being elected to hold office. In this case
questions naturally arise as to what happens to the Office of the First Lady. Will the
office be degendered, abolished, or allowed greater access to the logos-centric realm of
political life? Of no small consequence to this change will be the name that a husband of
a female president may take. Will we have our First Dude, First Gentleman, or will that
political actor not be subject to expectations that he take on a role expressly connected to
his marriage to a woman? Although Hillary Clinton did not prevail at her bid for the
White House in 2016, the time is surely coming and with it great impact on the way
gender and power discourses are treated in this country.
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Third, emotion has had a prominent emphasis in studies of affect that seek to
understand how emotion may act as a motivating source for protest in democracy. This
study inverted that line of scholarship to see how emotion is drawn from the center,
through primary and powerful actors, in the effort of shaping national identity. I believe
that future research where this frame of pathetic politics is applied to political actors at
the margins of society is fruitful in that it will help further shape our knowledge of this
concept.
A primary site for future research related to this work is within the realm of affect
and affective citizenship. Within the field of affect, future work may consider the
potential for collapsing the binary as useful for the development of the concept of affect
as a whole. Within the work on affective citizenship, where citizens participate in part on
what we recognize as value laden identity politics there is much work to be done. Post the
2016 election there are vocal calls for the Democratic Party to abandon a platform laden
with identity politics. A prominent opinion editorial in The New York Times argued, “It is
at the level of electoral politics that identity liberalism has failed most spectacularly, as
we have seen. National politics in healthy periods is not about ‘difference.’ It is about
commonality,” (Lilla, 2016). This debate is one that often reemerges in democratic defeat
and will most likely not be settled in the immediate aftermath of Trump’s election, but it
is an important reminder that politics and emotion have always been and will always
remain inextricably linked to emotion.
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This dissertation explores the theoretical and practical relationship
between our understandings of emotion’s role in political decision-making. In this
pursuit I seek a resurrection for pathos’s legitimacy in rhetorical studies through
the pursuit of the pathetic political realm. This work has three primary concerns:
how may pathetic power be accessed, from where does this power originate, and
how might political actors enact this power for their own political goals. I draw
primarily from theories related to visual rhetoric and the body in order to provide
perspective on how the body is politicized through the pathetic realm. As a site
for analysis I look to Michelle Obama’s time in the Office of the First Lady.
Theoretical perspectives are drawn from a range of scholars including Aristotle,
Robert Hariman, and Susan Bordo to extricate the positioning of the body within
American politics.
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